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Abstract
Healthcare-associated infections due to multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria (MDR-GNB) are a leading cause of morbidity and
mortality worldwide. These evidence-based guidelines have been produced after a systematic review of published studies on infection
prevention and control interventions aimed at reducing the transmission of MDR-GNB. The recommendations are stratiﬁed by type of
infection prevention and control intervention and species of MDR-GNB and are presented in the form of ‘basic’ practices, recommended
for all acute care facilities, and ‘additional special approaches’ to be considered when there is still clinical and/or epidemiological and/or
molecular evidence of ongoing transmission, despite the application of the basic measures. The level of evidence for and strength of each
recommendation, were deﬁned according to the GRADE approach.
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Introduction
Healthcare-associated infections (HAIs) are a leading cause of
morbidity and mortality worldwide. Therapy is becoming ever
more difﬁcult because of the increasing rate of antimicrobial
resistance among common HAI pathogens. Over the last
decade, multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria
(MDR-GNB), including MDR-Pseudomonas aeruginosa,
MDR-Acinetobacter baumannii and Enterobacteriaceae produc-
ing extended-spectrum b-lactamases (ESBL) and carbapene-
mases, have been implicated in severe HAIs and their
occurrence has increased steadily.
In 2011, the European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance
System network (EARS-Net), including 29 European countries,
reported a general European-wide increase of antimicrobial
resistance in the Gram-negative pathogens under surveillance
(Escherichia coli, Klebsiella pneumoniae and P. aeruginosa; avail-
able from: http://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publica-
tions/Forms/ECDC_DispForm.aspx?ID=998). The proportion
of reported E. coli isolates resistant to third-generation
cephalosporins (most of which were ESBL-producers) ranged
from 3% to 36% and had increased signiﬁcantly over the last
4 years in more than half of EARS-Net reporting countries.
High proportions of antimicrobial-resistant P. aeruginosa have
been reported by many countries, especially in southern and
eastern Europe, with 15.3% of isolates resistant to at least
three antimicrobial classes and 4.6% resistant to all ﬁve
antimicrobial classes under surveillance. Trends of carbapenem
resistance showed a signiﬁcant increase between 2008 and
2011 for ﬁve countries (Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece
and France). In 2011, 22.3% of all K. pneumoniae invasive
isolates were resistant to at least three antimicrobial classes.
Remarkably, a signiﬁcant increase in resistance to carbapen-
ems in K. pneumoniae from 8% to 15% was reported over
the period 2005–2010 (available from: http://www.ecdc.euro
pa.eu/en/publications/Publications/Forms/ECDC_DispForm.as
px?ID=580).
In the USA, data reported to the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) National Nosocomial Infec-
tion Surveillance System and the National Healthcare Safety
Network reﬂect an increase over the past decade in rates of
infections caused by some MDR-GNB, deﬁned as resistance
to one or more tested antimicrobials in three or more
antimicrobial classes [1]. Among Gram-negative organisms
associated with central line-associated bloodstream infec-
tions, catheter-associated urinary tract infections, ventila-
tor-associated pneumonia and surgical site infections that
were reported to the National Healthcare Safety Network
during 2009–2010, approximately 15% of K. pneumoniae or
Klebsiella oxytoca, 2% of E. coli, and 65% of A. baumannii
isolates met MDR-GNB criteria. Moreover, nearly one-ﬁfth
of hospitals reporting central line-associated bloodstream
infections or catheter-associated urinary tract infections due
to Klebsiella species noted the occurrence of carbape-
nem-resistant Klebsiella isolates, reﬂecting the penetration of
MDR-GNB into the microbiological milieu of many US
hospitals [1]. As in many other countries, the emergence of
carbapenemase-producing Enterobacteriaceae, and in partic-
ular K. pneumoniae isolates containing the blakpc gene, has
become a major healthcare epidemiology issue, with the
ST258 multilocus sequence type strain accounting for
approximately 70% of K. pneumoniae carbapenemase-produc-
ing isolates sent to the CDC [2]. Of even greater concern is
the rapid spread, both in the USA and in Europe, of
Enterobacteriaceae harbouring the New Delhi metallo-b-lac-
tamase and the K. pneumoniae carbapenemase in hospitalized
patients [3].
The infection prevention and control (IPC) measures that
have been applied in hospitals for MDR-GNB vary widely, both
within and between different countries [4]. A harmonized
approach, deriving from the application of evidence-based core
strategies and comprising speciﬁc strategies that related to
local characteristics and context, should result in a more
comparable situation. However, there is no consensus as to
the most effective IPC interventions or the best combination
of interventions to reduce transmission of MDR-GNB in
hospitalized patients. In particular, there is no consensus on
species or types that are more likely to require control
measures, or on the role of screening to identify carriers.
Previous guidelines have either not addressed, or have
provided only limited consideration to IPC implications of
MDR-GNB. The Health Care Infection Control Practices
Advisory Committee (HICPAC)/CDC guidelines, published in
2006, provided only generic guidance for control of all
MDR-organisms [5]. Guidance documents for control of HAIs
due to carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE) were
published in 2009 [6] and in 2012 by the CDC (available from:
http://www.cdc.gov/hai/organisms/cre/cre-toolkit/index.html)
and in 2011 by the European Centre for Disease Prevention
and Control (ECDC) (available at http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/
publications/Publications/110913_Risk_assessment_resistant_
CPE.pdf). Although these publications focus on controlling
the spread of MDR-GNB strains, they do not provide an
analysis of the strength of recommendations or grade of
evidence.
We performed a systematic review of the articles published
on this topic to determine the effects of different IPC
interventions aimed at minimizing the spread of MDR-GNB
and to deﬁne the indications for application of IPC measures
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for speciﬁc types of resistant strains in adult hospitalized
patients. Our guidelines have been drawn up so as to be useful
for a wide range of healthcare professionals, namely specialist
physicians and other healthcare workers (infectious diseases,
microbiology, surgery, intensive care), public health ofﬁcers,
infection control professionals, administrative personnel in
hospitals, and epidemiologists.
Methods
Articles presenting data pertaining to the control of
the spread, in hospitalized patients, of MDR-P. aeruginosa,
A. baumannii and Enterobacteriaceae and organisms intrinsi-
cally resistant to broad-spectrum antimicrobial agents, such as
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia and Burkholderia cepacia, were
identiﬁed through computerized literature searches using
MEDLINE (National Library of Medicine Bethesda, MD),
EMBASE and the Cochrane database and by reviewing the
references of retrieved articles. For the development of the
background section we also reviewed articles describing the
epidemiology of target bacteria. MDR organisms were deﬁned
according to the ECDC/CDC deﬁnition [7] as those
micro-organisms that were resistant to at least one agent in
three or more antimicrobial categories. Index search terms
included: ‘Pseudomonas’ or ‘Citrobacter’ or ‘Enterobacter’ or
‘Escherichia’ or ‘Klebsiella’ or ‘Morganella’ or ‘Proteus’ or
‘Providencia’ or ‘Serratia’ or ‘Acinetobacter’ or ‘Enterobacteria-
ceae’ or ‘Stenotrophomonas maltophilia’ or ‘Burkholderia cepacia’
and ‘drug resistance’ or ‘antibiotic resistance’ and ‘cross
infection’ or ‘infection control’ or ‘infection prevention’ or
‘patient isolation’ or ‘cohorting’ or ‘gloves’ or ‘protective
clothing’ or ‘handwashing’ or ‘hand hygiene’ or ‘sanitizer’ or
‘cleanser’ or ‘disinfectant’ or ‘pre-emptive isolation’ or ‘anti-
sepsis’ or ‘disinfection’ or ‘sterilization’ or ‘environmental
cleaning’ or ‘screening culture’ or ‘disease outbreaks’ or
‘antibiotic restriction or cycling’. The search was restricted to
full articles published in English up to November 2011 and
including adult patients (>16 years of age). Articles reporting
intervention(s) on paediatric population were excluded. No
attempt was made to obtain information on unpublished
studies. As data from randomized clinical trials were expected
to be limited, we also reviewed non-randomized controlled
clinical trials, interrupted time-series, and before-and-after
studies that compared wards or hospitals applying two
different intervention policies to control the spread of
MDR-GNB. We also reviewed outbreak investigations and
cohort studies. Single case reports were excluded. Papers
were reviewed according to the epidemiological setting
(outbreak versus endemic, see Table 1). The term ‘outbreak’
was deﬁned as an unusual or unexpected increase of cases of
infections due to MDR-GNB already isolated in the hospital or
the emergence of cases of infection due to a new MDR-GNB,
with or without molecular analysis of strains. ‘Endemic’ was
TABLE 1. Deﬁnitions of epidemiological setting
Endemic Settings where there are constant
challenges from admissions of patients
colonized or infected with MDR-GNB
Epidemic
(outbreak)
Settings where there is an unusual or
unexpected increase of cases of infections
due to MDR-GNB already isolated in the
hospital or an emergence of cases of
infection due to a new MDR-GNB, with
or without molecular analysis of strains
MDR-GNB, multidrug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria.
TABLE 2. Quality of evidence and strength or recom-
mendations according to the GRADE approach (avail-
able from: http://www.gradeworkinggroup.org)
Quality of evidence
High We are very conﬁdent that the true effect
lies close to that of the estimate of the
effect
Moderate We are moderately conﬁdent in the effect
estimate: the true effect is likely to be close
to the estimate of the effect, but there is a
possibility that it is substantially different
Low Our conﬁdence in the effect estimate is
limited: the true effect may be substantially
different from the estimate of the effect
Very low We have very little conﬁdence in the effect
estimate: the true effect is likely to be
substantially different from the estimate of
effect
Strength of recommendations
Strong Large differences between the desirable and
undesirable consequences.
High conﬁdence in the magnitude of
estimates of effect of the interventions on
important outcomes
Conditional Small net beneﬁt and low certainty for that
beneﬁt.
Great variability in values and preferences, or
uncertainty in values and preferences.
High cost of an intervention
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applied to settings where there were constant challenges from
admissions of patients colonized or infected with MDR-GNB,
but with no major changes over time recognized as distinct
acquisition from a common source. The various types of IPC
interventions used to prevent and control the spread of
MDR-GNB were grouped into ﬁve main categories: hand
hygiene measures (HH); active screening cultures (ASC);
contact precautions (CP); environmental cleaning (EC); and
antimicrobial stewardship (ABS).
The quality of studies was classiﬁed as high, moderate, low
or very low, whereas the strength of recommendations was
classiﬁed as strong or conditional according to the GRADE
methodology (available from: http://www.gradeworkinggroup.
org). Tables 2 and 3 describe in detail the GRADE approach,
grades of evidence and determinants of quality. In case of
disagreement among members, the quality of the paper
reporting outbreaks was further deﬁned through the ORION
checklist for outbreak reporting [8]. For the cumulative
evidence the authors agreed that an overall ‘moderate’
classiﬁcation required at least one intervention of ‘moderate’
quality and that the sum of ‘moderate’ research study(ies) plus
‘low’ research study(ies) needed to be ≥50% of the available
evidence. For the development of guidelines, the Standard and
Practice Guidelines Committee recommendations were fol-
lowed (available from: http://www.idsociety.org/Guideline_
Resources/).
The major limitation of grading the evidence for IPC
measures and MDR-GNB was related to the fact that almost
all measures were included in different combinations in
multifaceted approaches. When multiple interventions were
introduced in different moments the authors analysed the
single intervention according to the related magnitude of the
effect. In case of multiple interventions introduced at the same
moment, the evidence and strength of recommendations were
derived from the cumulative evaluation of the efﬁcacy of the
whole bundle where the speciﬁc IPC measure was included.
Mechanisms of Transmission
A review of the literature on mechanisms of transmission of
MDR-GNB was problematic for three main reasons: (i) the
low number of studies; (ii) the low availability of high-quality
studies; and (iii) the high heterogeneity of deﬁnitions, settings
and pathogens. Patient-to-patient transmission was frequently
thought to be the most important route of transmission
whenever several patients shared clonally related isolates. This
is based on the hypothesis that colonized or infected patients
are the only reservoir for the microorganism. However,
intermediate vectors for spread between patients, including
contaminated hands of healthcare workers (HCWs), environ-
ment, and visitors should also be taken into consideration for
the prevention and control of healthcare-associated
MDR-GNB transmission.
Extra-intestinal pathogenic Escherichia coli
Although an important cause of HAIs, E. coli is mainly a
community pathogen. As the constant inﬂux of community
isolates colonizing patients at hospital admission is highly
signiﬁcant in the epidemiology of these organisms within
hospitals, understanding the complex epidemiological behav-
iour of E. coli in the community is key to adequate interpre-
tation of studies addressing the epidemiology of E. coli in
hospitalized patients. This microorganism belongs to the
normal bowel ﬂora in humans, other mammals and birds.
Strains have traditionally been classiﬁed as commensal
(because they less frequently cause disease and mainly belong
to phylogenetic group A and B1), intestinal pathogenic (mainly
obligate pathogens) and extra-intestinal pathogenic (most
often of phylogenetic groups B2 and D). The latter are the
predominant strains in 20% of individuals and harbour the
typical virulence factors causing extra-intestinal infections
when reaching the appropriate site from the bowel, which
TABLE 3. Factors increasing or decreasing the level of studies’ quality according to the GRADE approach
(available from: http://www.gradeworkinggroup.org)
Study design
Initial quality of
a body evidence
Decrease
quality Increase quality
Randomized trials High Risk of bias Large effect (RRR 50% or RR 2)
Inconsistency Very large effect (RRR 80% or RR 5)
Observational studies Low Indirectness Dose response
Imprecision All plausible residual confounding may be working
to reduce the demonstrated effect or increase the
effect if no effect was observed
Publication bias
RRR, relative risk reduction; RR, relative risk.
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serves as their primary reservoir [9]. Transmission of
extra-intestinal pathogenic E. coli in the community is thought
to occur by person-to-person transmission, either through
direct contact or by means of a faecal–oral route through or
by contaminated food and/or water [10]. Several clonal
groups of antibiotic-resistant extra-intestinal pathogenic
E. coli, speciﬁcally, O15:H1-D-ST393, CGA-D-ST69, and
O25b:H4-B2-ST131 are extensively distributed and mainly
associated with community outbreaks of urinary tract infec-
tions [10–15]. It is probable that the spread of these clonal
groups within the hospitals had occurred much earlier, but
went unnoticed in the absence of an epidemiological marker,
such as antibiotic resistance. Food was suspected as the main
source for O15:H1-D-ST393 and CGA-D-ST69 [10] but the
main sources and mechanisms of transmission for O25b:
H4-B2-ST131 are not yet clear.
The epidemiology of E. coliwithin healthcare facilities has not
been extensively studied. Researchers have mainly focused on
MDR isolates. However, the reservoirs and mechanisms of
transmission have rarely been investigated. The results of
molecular typing need to be interpreted with caution. The
ﬁnding of clonally related strains does not necessarily mean that
there was transmission within the healthcare institution, but
rather may reﬂect the inﬂux of a successful clone or clones from
the community [16–19]. Community isolates belonging to such
clonal groups have shown a high degree of similarity in pulsed
ﬁeld gel electrophoresis dendrograms, even when isolated from
patients from different areas [15]. Hence, ﬁndings from
molecular typing of nosocomial isolates must be combined
with knowledge of community-circulating clones and the clinical
epidemiology (e.g. date of admission and when the ﬁrst screen
was positive) for meaningful interpretation. Such data may, of
course, also provide evidence of a constant inﬂux of clonally
diverse strains from the community. Without such detailed
epidemiological information, one might otherwise mistakenly
consider such a situation to comprise a nosocomial outbreak.
Finally, contaminated food products are known to be frequent
vehicles for E. coli strains [20]. However, the signiﬁcance of
alimentary transmission of antibiotic-resistant E. coli within
hospitals has been poorly studied in developed countries.
In the 1960s and 1980s some nosocomial outbreaks of
pyelonephritis were indirectly associated with transmission
from HCWs [21–23]. In 2001, Paterson et al. [24] reported a
clonal outbreak caused by ESBL-producing E. coli in a liver
transplantation unit causing bacteraemia in two patients, with
seven others only colonized. The epidemic strain was not
found either in the environment or on the hands of staff. CP
and intestinal decolonization of patients with norﬂoxacin,
active against the outbreak strain, was instituted and the
outbreak was eradicated.
A few studies have tried to identify environmental reser-
voirs, despite the fact that in some instances patients
harbouring the clonally related isolates did not have overlap-
ping stays in the unit. In a study performed in Brazil, E. coli was
found on the hands of only one out of 100 HCWs, whereas
other organisms were found much more frequently [25]. In a
study on Intensive Care Unit (ICU) patients, Harris et al. [26]
found 23 patients out of a total of more than 1800 admissions
to have acquired colonization with ESBL-producing E. coli
during their ICU stay. In only three of these 23 patients the
isolates were identical by pulsed ﬁeld gel electrophoresis to
those found in 74 other patients colonized upon admission
screening, suggesting that patient-to-patient transmission was
not an important cause of acquisition of ESBL-producing E. coli
in this ICU in a non-outbreak setting. Once again, environ-
mental or food sources were not investigated.
Recently, three studies have investigated the transmission
dynamics of ESBL-producing E. coli. Adler et al. [27] focused
their study in two geriatric rehabilitation wards in Israel. They
found that 32 out of the 59 ‘new acquisitions’ (54%) were
traced to another patient and this was particularly frequent for
two speciﬁc clones (ST131 producing CTX-M-27 and ST372
producing SHV-5). Interestingly, the situation differed in a
Swiss tertiary hospital, where ESBL-producing E. coli was
acquired only by 1.5% of hospital patients in contact with
colonized/infected patients [28]. In addition, in another study
the transmission of ESBL-producing E. coli was shown to be
more frequent in households than in the hospital setting [29].
These results suggest that person-to-person transmissions of
some ESBL-producing E. coli occur, but are not common in
most hospital settings.
Klebsiella species
There have been several recent studies of the epidemiology of
K. pneumoniae as a nosocomial pathogen. This organism shows
a clear trend to spread clonally within healthcare institutions
and exhibits a particular ability to cause nosocomial outbreaks
[30,31]. This may be a feature of some speciﬁc successful
clones and antibiotic resistance may provide an additional
advantage in healthcare settings to such clones. Cross-trans-
mission via HCWs’ hands seems to be important in the
nosocomial spread of K. pneumoniae strains [31]. Indeed there
is extensive evidence for transmission via the hands of HCWs
from colonized patients or environmental reservoirs to new
patients, in both epidemic and endemic situations [32–47].
However, in a recent study, an outbreak caused by contam-
inated food was described, indicating that transmission may
also occur via the food chain [48]. Additionally, transmission
from contaminated sinks has been recently shown for
ESBL-producing K. oxytoca [49].
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Other Enterobacteriaceae
Enterobacter spp. and Serratia spp. (particularly Enterobacter
cloacae and Serratia marcescens) are important nosocomial
pathogens and outbreaks caused by these organisms have been
documented. Cross-transmission via transient contamination
of HCWs’ hands has also been well documented in epidemic
and endemic situations [50–65] and outbreaks of bacteraemia
involving both species have also been linked to contaminated
medical products [51]. Contamination both of dry surfaces and
moist environments was particularly frequent when looked
for, suggesting that environmental contamination played a
central role in many outbreaks.
Nosocomial outbreaks caused by Salmonella spp. have also
been described. Although most of these were probably
food-borne-related, cross-transmission through the hands of
HCWs was also suspected to have occurred [66–69].
Non-fermentative GNB
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is commonly associated with moist
environmental sources. Colonized patients may serve as
reservoirs for epidemic strains. However, the epidemiology
of this organism is complex, as sporadic and epidemic strains
usually coexist, so that outbreaks may be difﬁcult or impossible
to trace unless molecular methods are used [70,71]. The
source and mechanism of transmission of different strains may
vary. HCWs’ hands can be contaminated from patient or
environmental sources [25,41,71–75]. Hence, patients may
acquire the organism from the environment, e.g. when using
contaminated sinks, showers or respiratory equipment, or via
HCWs’ hands. Patient-to-patient transmission of epidemic
clones of P. aeruginosa among patients with cystic ﬁbrosis has
been documented. Recent experimental and clinical data
showed that patients with cystic ﬁbrosis can generate droplet
nuclei in the respirable range and that infectious particles can
be cultured from room air minutes to hours after patients have
left [76]. Data from the USA showed that the rate of bacterial
contamination of cystic ﬁbrosis clinics with respiratory tract
pathogens, including P. aeruginosa, was 13.6%; the air collected
within 3 feet (90 cm) of patients, their hands, and the
environment was contaminated during 8.2%, 6.2% and 1% of
visits, respectively [77,78].
The epidemiology of A. baumannii has been thoroughly
reviewed [79]. Acinetobacter baumannii may cause monoclonal
outbreaks, usually related to an environmental source, or as
complex, extensively polyclonal situations, in which epidemic and
sporadic clones coexist [80,81]. Environmental contamination,
both of dry and moist areas, is key to the dissemination of
A. baumannii. Colonized patientsmay serve as effective reservoirs
and HCWs’ hands can serve as vehicles for transmission either
from contaminated surfaces to patients or between patients.
Nosocomial infections caused by Stenotrophomonas malto-
philia are usually caused by sporadic strains, probably acquired
from different environmental wet sources [51]. However, a
few outbreaks of indistinguishable strains related to a
common environmental source or cross-transmission have
been reported [82–85]. Burkholderia cepacia may also cause
nosocomial outbreaks, typically associated with medical
products or environmental moist sources [51,82]
Cross-transmission has been documented between cystic
ﬁbrosis patients [86,87] and may occur among non-cystic
ﬁbrosis patients [88].
The Role of Hand Hygiene to Prevent
Spread of MDR-GNB
The role of HCWs’ hand contamination has been under
investigation since the 1960s [89]. Before performing hand
disinfection, up to 40% of nurses’ hands yielded coliform
bacteria, although rates depended on the type of unit sampled
[33,90]. Another study showed that 17% of ICU staff carried
Klebsiella spp. on their hands and that these strains were
probably related to colonized or infected patients resident in the
unit [91]. An epidemicMDR-Klebsiella spp. survived on ﬁngertips
better than susceptible strains and persisted longer than E. coli
and P. aeruginosa [91]. Coliforms can be picked up on the hands
of nurses after touching patients’ washing materials and clothing,
as well as after bed-making, toileting activities, handling bed linen
and curtains, and even after administering medications to the
patients [92]. Transfer of viable amounts of Klebsiella spp. to
nurses’ hands took place after simple ‘clean’ procedures, such as
washing the patient and touching several parts of the body during
nursing activities (i.e. taking blood pressure, pulse and oral
temperature) [33]. Sampling patients’ hands on a speciﬁc ward
demonstrated rates of coliform carriage similar to rates of
carriage for nurses on that ward [92]. Hand contamination
despite wearing gloves has been reported in 4.5% and 1% of
HCWs after caring for MDR-A. baumannii and MDR-P. aerugin-
osa colonized or infected patients, respectively [93].
The mechanism of microbe cross-transmission is summa-
rized in the World Health Organization (WHO) 2009 HH
guidelines ‘ﬁve moments’ (available from: http://whqlibdoc.
who.int/publications/2009/9789241597906_eng.pdf): (1) pres-
ence of microbes on patient skin and/or in patient’s environ-
ment, (2) transfer of these organisms to HCWs’ hands, (3)
microbe survival on HCWs’ hands, (4) incorrect hand
cleansing by HCWs, and (5) cross-transmission to other
patients. The following section will focus on the different
‘moments’ of cross-transmission of GNB according to the ﬁve-
step-WHO sequence.
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(1) Microbes on patient’s skin and environment. The number of
GNB on the skin is strikingly low if compared to the high
level of GNB colonizing the gut. GNB counts in the
intestine reach 109–1011 CFU/g of homogenized tissue,
while they are virtually absent from large areas of skin [94].
GNB are isolated more frequently from axilla, perineum
and toe webs, which represent humid and partially
occluded areas, where the skin bacterial count is highest
(106–107 CFU/cm2) [94,95]. Recent molecular data show
that GNB can be found in abundance on some dry skin
sites, including parts of the hands [94].
Acinetobacter calcoaceticus is the GNB most frequently
found on normal skin, colonizing up to 25% of individuals
[96]; other GNB are identiﬁed less commonly as part of
the transient skin ﬂora. Hospitalized patients, unlike
healthy subjects, may have higher rates of skin colonization
with Acinetobacter species and other GNB, especially in the
perineal area [97–100].
(2) Transfer of GNB to HCWs’ hands. Many studies over the
last decades have reported that up to 100% of HCWs’
hands can be contaminated by GNB, including Enterobac-
teriaceae, P. aeruginosa, Acinetobacter spp. and other
potential pathogens [33,101,102]. GNB counts on HCWs’
hands may vary substantially and are related to the type of
contact with the patient or the patient’s immediate
environment. The risk of hand contamination has also
varied depending on the microbe. Morgan et al. evaluated
about 200 opportunities of staff providing assistance to
patients colonized or infected with MDR-A. baumannii and
MDR-P. aeruginosa. They observed hand contamination in
4.5% of HCWs assisting patients with MDR-A. baumannii,
compared with 0.7% of those caring for patients with
MDR-P. aeruginosa. Risk factors for HCWs’ hand contam-
ination with MDR-A. baumannii were manipulation of
wound dressings, staying in the patients’ rooms for more
than 5 min, and being a physician or nurse practitioner
[93]. Rodriguez-Ba~no et al. [81] observed rates of HCWs’
hand colonization by MDR-A. baumannii between 12% and
20% in an ICU where this organism was endemic.
A team from the University of Maryland investigated
the frequency of transfer of pathogens during the treat-
ment of ICU patients with MDR-A. baumannii and/or
MDR-P. aeruginosa [103]. Contamination of HCWs’ gloves
and hands veriﬁed after glove removal but before hand
hygiene was observed in 29.3% and 4.2% of HCWs with
MDR-A. baumannii, respectively, and in 17.4% and 3.5%
with MDR-P. aeruginosa, respectively [103].
(3) Microbe survival on HCWs’ hands. GNB may survive on
HCWs’ hands for periods lasting from a few minutes to
several hours, depending on the species. Notably, GNB
have been isolated from the hands of individuals not
involved in healthcare in proportions similar to those
reported for HCWs [101]. Acinetobacter spp. may be
isolated from skin for long periods of time after inoculation
[104], usually longer than other GNB. Fagernes and Lingas
demonstrated that wearing jewellery, such as a single ring,
may triple the risk of Enterobacteriaceae hand carriage
[105]. Sampling was performed while HCWs were on duty
and no evaluation of post-duty hand colonization was
performed. Artiﬁcial ﬁngernails became colonized with
GNB more frequently than natural nails and alcohol-based
hand rubs were less effective in eliminating GNB from the
former than the latter [106]. Artiﬁcial ﬁngernails have been
associated with HAIs, including outbreaks of bloodstream
infections due to Serratia marcescens in haemodialysis
patients [107] and of ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae and
P. aeruginosa invasive infections in neonatal ICUs, although
the associations were weak [108].
(4) Incorrect hand cleansing by HCWs. In one study, if no or
inadequate HH was performed during patient care, the level
of hand contamination increased progressively in a linear
fashion over time, so favouring cross-transmission [102]. A
signiﬁcant reduction inmicrobe counts has been reported by
a limited number of studies evaluating hand washing and/or
hand rubbing, although data regarding MDR-GNB are
scarce. Paul et al. observed a signiﬁcant reduction in GNB
counts when HH was performed both with soap and
water and with alcohol hand-rubs soap [109]. Data show
that alcohol-based hand-rubs could reduce A. baumannii
counts by 98% from experimentally contaminated hands
[110].
(5) Cross-transmission to other patients. The prevalence of
possible cross-transmission of GNB among patients is
difﬁcult to evaluate. Studies in the ICU population applying
conventional and molecular methods report percentages
of cross-transmission ranging from 23% to 53% of patients’
contacts [111,112]. Lingaas and Fagemes [113] developed
a method to investigate the transfer of E. coli from the
hands of HCWs. The method involved standardized hand
contact between the HCW and a recipient wearing sterile
gloves, followed by sampling of the bare hands of the
HCW and the gloved hands of the recipient by the glove
juice method. A smaller proportion of E. coli was recov-
ered from bare skin compared with gloves, suggesting
reduced survival of bacteria as a result of contact with
natural skin [113].
Clothing of HCWs can be contaminated by nosocomial
pathogens and therefore be a source for cross-transmission of
healthcare-associated pathogens [114–119]. Such attire is
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progressively contaminated by an HCWs’ own ﬂora, which is
generally of low pathogenicity and constitutes about a third of
the isolated germs. Flora from patients or the hospital
environment represents the remaining two-thirds of microor-
ganisms found on clothing [116,119]. The areas of attire with
the heaviest colonization are the zones most frequently
touched by hands, i.e. below the waist, and on the sleeves
and pockets [114,115,119]. In one paper, the level of bacterial
contamination did not vary with the length of time a coat had
been in use, but it increased with the degree of usage by the
individual doctor [115]. Performing procedures involving
heavily contaminated body sites, such as dressing wounds,
may cause high levels of clothing contamination [119].
Protective clothing, particularly plastic aprons, have been
associated with a signiﬁcant reduction in clothing contamina-
tion in high-risk settings such as burn units [116,120]. During
clinical activity other items worn, such as badges and lanyards,
may also become contaminated [121].
Contamination of gowns and gloves has been shown to be a
frequent event during patient care [93,103]. In particular, gown
contamination with MDR-A. baumannii has been observed in
11–12% of HCWs when caring for colonized patients [93,103].
In the same studies, MDR-P. aeruginosa contaminated HCWs
gowns less frequently, i.e. 4–5% [93,103]. Since not all
healthcare systems supply uniforms processed in an industrial
laundry, staff may need to launder their uniforms at home.
Wilson et al. [116] show that there is no substantial difference
between home and industrial laundering concerning microbial
residual contamination.
Recommendations
Epidemic setting
Strong recommendation: Implement HH education
programmes to reduce the transmission of ESBL-
producing Enterobacteriaceae. MDR-A. baumannii,
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia (moderate level of evidence);
MDR-K. pneumoniae, MDR-P. aeruginosa and Burkholderia
cepacia (very low level of evidence)
Endemic setting
Strong recommendation: Implement hand hygiene (HH)
education programmes to reduce the transmission of
extended-spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL)-producing
Enterobacteriaceae, multidrug-resistant (MDR)-
Klebsiella pneumoniae, MDR-Pseudomonas aeruginosa,
MDR-Acinetobacter baumannii (moderate level of
evidence); Stenotrophomonas maltophilia and Burkholderia
cepacia (very low level of evidence)
The Role of Contact Precautions to Prevent
Spread
Basic infection control precautions (i.e. standard precautions)
need to be used, as a minimum, in the care of all patients and are
meant to reduce the risk of transmission of blood-borne and
other microorganisms from both recognized and unrecognized
sources. They include HH, and personal protective equipment
guided by risk assessment and the extent of contact anticipated
with blood and body ﬂuids, or pathogens. In addition to standard
precautions, CP include: wearing a gown and gloves upon entry
to a room of a patient/resident colonized or infected with
epidemiologically targeted bacteria and using disposable sin-
gle-use or patient/resident-dedicated non-critical care equip-
ment (such as blood pressure cuffs and stethoscopes).
Once MDR-bacteria infection or carriage is detected in
hospitalized patients, most international guidelines recom-
mend the application of CP to these patients to prevent
hospital spread [5,6]. There are multiple ways of implementing
such CP. For example, patients can be transferred to special
isolation wards or housed in nursing cohorts, i.e. in separate
rooms on general wards with designated nursing staff exclu-
sively responsible for the cohort. Alternatively, colonized
patients can be isolated in single or cohort rooms on general
wards without designated personnel. Third, the application of
CP can be performed housing the patients in the same room
with patients unaffected by MDR-GNB, but applying CP (e.g. as
deﬁned above including the use of gloves and gowns or aprons
depending on the extent of carriage by the patient and the
procedures being performed by staff) when caring for the
colonized or infected patient. Notably, in the ECDC systematic
review to deﬁne the effectiveness of IPC measures to decrease
the incidence of colonization or infection with CRE, the most
effective approach included CP, screening for early detection
of CRE-colonized patients, and cohort nursing care for
CRE-colonized patients (available from: http://ecdc.europa.eu/
en/publications/Publications/110913_Risk_assessment_resis-
tant_CPE.pdf). Suboptimal adherence to CP was linked to
limited impact on HAI outcomes.
The efﬁcacy of CP can be optimized through an effective and
consistent approach to screening cultures, not only to identify
all carriers but also to monitor the success of any isolation or
infection prevention measure. An alert code for previously
known positive patients followed by pre-emptive CP could help
in reducing the spread of MDR-GNB. Evidence derives from
successful interventions in the endemic setting on MDR-P. aeru-
ginosa [122] and during outbreaks by ESBL-producing Entero-
bacteriaceae and MDR-K. pneumoniae [123–127]. Weekly
screening cultures in addition to those on admission and
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discharge might optimize the CP, especially in high-risk settings
and in case of long hospitalization [125,128,129].
No consensus exists on when CP may be discontinued. The
majority of the studies on CP applied this measure until two or
three negative screening cultures taken a week apart were
obtained. Rarely CP were maintained during the entire
hospitalization period.
The authors of these guidelines suggest discontinuing them
when three or more screening cultures for the target
MDR-organism are repeatedly negative over the course of a
week or two in a patient who has not received antimicrobial
therapy for several weeks.
There is no study focused on the use of surgical masks as a
component of CP in the management of patients with respira-
tory colonization or infection due to MDR-GNB. A few papers
reporting outbreaks due to MDR-A. baumannii added masks on
top of CP in the ICU settings with favourable results [129–131].
CP in epidemic settings
Effectiveness of CP in controlling an outbreak due to
MDR-A. baumannii has been reported by Gbaguidi-Haor et al.
[132] The authors applied CP and patient cohorting for all
patients colonized or infected with A. baumannii, whatever the
antibiotic susceptibility of the strain. Once new cases of
colonization or infection due to MDR-A. baumannii were no
longer detected, the systematic implementation of isolation
precautions and patient cohorting was stopped for a 2-year
period. A resurgence in the number of A. baumannii-colonized
or -infected patients led to reimplementation of CP, resulting
in a consequent decrease in the incidence of patients with
A. baumannii colonization or infection. The changes in the
application of CP were also associated with a decrease in the
number of patients with A. baumannii bacteraemia [132].
Ineffectiveness of the implementation of CP and ASC in
epidemic setting has been reported. An outbreak of
MDR-A. baumannii was not controlled by setting up a
programme of screening for all patients in addition to
immediate isolation or cohorting of colonized patients. Ward
closures were necessary to contain the spread of MDR-A. bau-
mannii [133]. A possible explanation was that the lack of
pre-emptive isolation allowed cross-transmission among
patients. Environmental contamination and lack of proper
cleaning and disposal of contaminated equipment might have
also played a pivotal role in outbreaks [134,135].
The implementation of cohorting of patients and/or staff can
improve the effectiveness of a bundle approach to control an
outbreak due to MDR-GNB. Laurent et al. described the
failure of CP, isolation room and ASC in controlling an
outbreak of ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae. When the infec-
tion control measures were reinforced with the introduction
of cohorting of colonized/infected patients in a dedicated ICU
and total cohorting of nursing care and partial (daily shift only)
cohorting of medical staff, the outbreak was controlled.
According to the authors, cohorting was probably the most
important contributing measure [123].
In a study by Lucet et al. patient cohorting was applied for
surgical patients found to be ESBL-producing Enterobacteria-
ceae carriers, whereas in the other hospital units, CP alone
were used. Pre-emptive isolation precautions were also
recommended for patients transferred to the ICUs at risk of
being colonized. The IPC measures were ineffective during the
ﬁrst year. The main cause was probably the low compliance
rate with CP, despite a high rate of hand washing adherence.
Critical evaluation of the implementation of CP in the ICU
prompted corrective measures for CP and the incidence of
acquired cases subsequently decreased [124]. This seems to
suggest that auditing adherence to CP is at least as important
an issue as their introduction per se.
Recommendations
Epidemic setting
Strong recommendation: Implement contact precautions
(CP) for all patients colonized and/or infected with
extended-spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL)-producing
Enterobacteriaceae, multidrug-resistant (MDR)-
Klebsiella pneumoniae, MDR-Acinetobacter baumannii
(moderate level of evidence); and Pseudomonas aeruginosa
(very low level of evidence)
Strong recommendation: Use alert code to identify
promptly patients already known as colonized with
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae and MDR-K.
pneumoniae at hospital/ward admission and perform
screening and pre-emptive CP (moderate level of
evidence)
Strong recommendation: Isolate colonized and infected
patients in a single room to reduce the risk of acquisition of
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae, MDR-K. pneumoniae
(moderate level of evidence); MDR-A. baumannii and
MDR-P. aeruginosa (low level of evidence)
Strong recommendation: Cohort staff to reduce the risk of
acquisition of MDR-K. pneumoniae (moderate level of
evidence)
CP in endemic setting
Many interventions on MDR-GNB in endemic settings included
CP [122,136,137] and many national and international guidance
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documents and expert opinion publications recommend the
systematic use of CP in the management of MDR-GNB in the
endemic setting [5,6,138–140]. Rodriguez-Bano et al. [81]
reported hospital-wide successful control of MDR-A. bauman-
nii through a bundle strategy that included CP along with ASC,
HH, education, environmental and HCWs’ hand cultures, a
strict environmental cleaning policy, and regular staff meetings
with feedback of data. A signiﬁcant correlation between
implementation of CP and number of patients colonized or
infected with A. baumannii was reported in a large French
hospital [132] and, on a smaller scale, CP and ASC were
successfully applied in a surgical setting to control the
transmission of MDR-A. baumannii [141]. A signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in endemic carbapenem-resistant K. pneumoniae (CRKP)
was observed by Kochar et al. [122] through a multifaceted
intervention including CP. In the same intervention, no
decrease was observed in the isolation rates of A. baumannii
and P. aeruginosa. In Germany, Vonberg et al. [142] reported
their successful experience in a stable endemic situation,
including many high-risk patients, applying CP and isolation
room for all patients with MDR-GNB. These reports seem to
suggest that CP may have a signiﬁcant role in reducing
MDR-GNB spread in the endemic setting, although CP was
always included in a multifaceted approach and therefore its
speciﬁc effectiveness is difﬁcult to deﬁne.
Recommendations
Endemic setting
Strong recommendation: Implement contact precautions
(CP) for all patients colonized with extended-spectrum
b-lactamase (ESBL)-Enterobacteriaceae (with the
exception of Escherichia coli), multidrug-resistant (MDR)–
Klebsiella pneumoniae, MDR-Acinetobacter baumannii, and
MDR-Pseudomonas aeruginosa (moderate level of
evidence)
Strong recommendation: Use alert code to identify
promptly patients already known as colonized with
MDR-A. baumannii at hospital/ward admission and
perform screening and pre-emptive CP (moderate level of
evidence)
The Role of Active Screening Cultures to
Prevent Spread
Active screening culture allows the early identiﬁcation of
patients with colonization due to MDR-GNB at hospital
admission and/or during hospitalization in order to apply CP
and reduce person-to-person spread. This is based on the
well-established fact that a signiﬁcant reservoir of MDR-GNB
colonized patients in hospital will go undetected by relying on
results from clinical specimens submitted for routine diagnos-
tic testing [143–145].
Harris et al. [143] estimated that among patients admitted
to medical and surgical ICUs, the proportion of undetected
ESBL-producing E. coli and Klebsiella spp. was 69%. Importantly,
among patients with both positive clinical and screening
cultures, the latter were positive an average of 2.7 days
earlier than the clinical cultures [143]. Maragakis et al. [144]
reported an undetected ratio of MDR-A. baumannii of 50%
among patients in ICU. A point prevalence study in three New
York City ICUs revealed that 14 (39%) of 36 hospitalized
patients had faecal colonization with CRKP. The majority
(86%) of these patients were not identiﬁed by routine clinical
cultures [145].
The proportion of clinically evident cases among carriers
may vary according to the virulence of the organism, the
susceptibility of the particular patient population studied, and
quality of IPC measures, e.g. adherence to bundles. Studies
examining the relationship between colonization and infection
also depend on the sensitivity of the methods used to detect
colonization. For example, it has been shown that it may be
difﬁcult to detect the carriage of A. baumannii by routine
methods and that the best body site for screening has not been
well determined [136]. In contrast, although the site of
colonization for Enterobacteriaceae is better deﬁned, various
screening methods may differ in their sensitivity in identifying
speciﬁc resistant mechanisms or phenotypes.
The natural history of MDR-GNB colonization and
subsequent infection has not been well described and might
differ depending on the organism, the host’s features, and
other factors. Corbella et al. [146] evaluated faecal coloniza-
tion with MDR-A. baumannii in ICU patients and found that
clinical infections due to these strains occurred more
frequently in patients with, than without, previous faecal
colonization. Contrasting results have been reported during an
outbreak investigation, where the majority of ICU patients
harbouring CRKP did not develop clinical disease during their
hospitalization [125].
A recent clinical epidemiological investigation quantiﬁed the
sensitivity of perianal/rectal surveillance cultures in detecting
MDR-GNB bacteria and identiﬁed factors associated with
false-negative surveillance culture results [147]. In this study,
the sensitivity of perianal/rectal surveillance swabs for detect-
ing MDR-GNB colonization was 78%. The percentage was
higher than that reported in other studies, which ranged from
42% to 69% when only colonization of the rectal site
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with non-Acinetobacter MDR-GN species was considered
[148,149].
Since PCR-based approaches for screening of MDR-GNB are
still at an early stage, culture-based methodologies for screening
are the most reliable option and remain the most favourable in
terms of capacity and costs. Techniques using conventional
bacterial culture methods on agar plates for screening individ-
uals for MDR-GNB are well-established. Adequate samples are
usually rectal swabs, urine or respiratory secretions. HICPAC/
CDC guidelines recommend taking ASC for MDR-GNB from
areas of skin breakdown and draining wounds and, if a
respiratory tract reservoir is suspected, from endotracheal
tube aspirates or sputum. The Association for Professionals in
Infection Control and Epidemiology (APIC) guide for the
control of MDR-A. baumannii suggests culturing multiple patient
sites including the nose, throat, axilla, groin, rectum, open
wounds and/or tracheal aspirates (available from http://www.
apic.org/resource_/eliminationguideform/b8b0b11f-1808-4615-
890b-f652d116ba56/ﬁle/apic-ab-guide.pdf). Inoculation of the
sample on non-selective media (Columbia Agar with 5% Sheep
Blood; COS; BD, Franklin Lakes, NJ, USA) should be used as
growth and internal quality control. For ESBL detection,
inoculation on selective media (e.g. ESBL AgarchromIDTM Agar;
ESBL (bioMerieux, Marcy l’Etoile, France); Brilliance ESBL agar
from Oxoid (Basingstoke, UK) and media containing 1 mg/L of
cefotaxime or 4 mg/L of ceftazidime) may be used. MacConkey
agar supplemented with 1 mg/L of imipenem may be used for
the detection of carbapenamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae.
The incubation period is a maximum of 48 h under aerobic
conditions at 36°C. Only samples with concomitant growth on
COS are considered ‘valid’ (note that this applies only to
samples where growth of standard ﬂora is expected, e.g. rectal
swabs). Specimens should be identiﬁed and tested for antimi-
crobial susceptibility in a standardized way, e.g. according to the
European Committee on Antimicrobial Susceptibility Testing
(EUCAST). Automated techniques may facilitate microbial
identiﬁcation (e.g. MALDI-TOF mass spectrometry) and anti-
microbial susceptibility testing (e.g. Vitek2, BD PhoenixTM, BD).
The cost-effectiveness of these methods in different epidemi-
ological setting needs to be further deﬁned.
The frequency of screening is another key point for the
implementation of ASC, but no consensus exists on the
optimal timing and interval. ASC should be continued weekly
until no cases of colonization or infection, suggesting ongoing
cross-transmission, are identiﬁed [6]. A signiﬁcant problem is
also related to the lack of speciﬁc information related to the
duration of colonization. Snyder et al. reported that the
median duration of MDR-GNB colonization was 144 days
(range, 41–349 days) ranging from 121 days in Proteus spp. to
178 days in E. coli [150].
In a study assessing the sensitivity of various anatomical
sites for detecting baseline colonization with MDR-GNB,
surveillance cultures from six different sites (groin, perirectal
area, ﬁnger webs, forehead, axillae, toe webs) were per-
formed. The groin was the most sensitive site with the highest
negative predictive value for detecting MDR-GNB coloniza-
tion, including MDR-A. baumannii and ESBL-producing K. pneu-
moniae. The perirectal area had the second highest sensitivity
overall and was the most sensitive anatomic site for detecting
ESBL-producing E. coli. Sampling of both perirectal and groin
areas resulted in an increase of the overall sensitivity to 95%
[151]. In another study, patients with recent clinical isolation
(≤10 days) of MDR-A. baumannii and those with remote
clinical isolation (≥6 months), were compared to determine
optimal surveillance sampling sites. Screening for carriage was
conducted from six sites: nostrils, pharynx, skin, rectum,
wounds and endotracheal aspirates. Screening cultures yielded
MDR-A. baumannii from 55% (12/22) of patients with recent
clinical isolation, resulting in a sensitivity of 55% when six body
sites were sampled. Sensitivities of single sites ranged from
13.5% to 29%, indicating that the sensitivity of surveillance
cultures is low, even when six different body sites were
sampled [152].
It is important to underline that the effects of ASC are
related to the level of compliance to the intervention. As one
would expect, use of audit cycles (sometimes termed process
surveillance) to ensure that interventions are being performed
correctly predict the chances of success. Before implementing
ASC it is also important to clearly deﬁne which IPC
interventions need to be applied in patients found to be
positive and in others while awaiting screening results. The
introduction of the screening per se cannot be considered an
infection control measure. Careful planning should be elabo-
rated together with the hospital laboratory considering, among
other factors, local turnaround time and cost-effectiveness.
Speciﬁc plans should be deﬁned in case of isolation of CRE.
When identifying a previously unrecognized CRE, a point preva-
lence survey in high-risk areas should be performed. If CRE are
detected from clinical cultures or from the point prevalence
survey, active surveillance testing of patients with epidemiological
links to a patient with CRE infection should be conducted
(available from: http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/Publica-
tions/110913_Risk_assessment_resistant_CPE.pdf).
Despite the increasing clinical relevance of MDR-GNB
colonization among hospitalized patients and beneﬁcial previ-
ous experiences with the control of MDR-Gram-positive
bacteria, the question as to whether and when ASC should be
performed to identify MDR-GNB colonized patients is still
hotly debated. As yet, no internationally agreed guidelines have
clearly deﬁned how to organize and implement ASC for the
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detection of colonization with MDR-GNB at hospital admis-
sion, although all advocate targeted screening of high-risk
patients in endemic or outbreak settings.
In recent years hospitals in many countries have experi-
enced increases in the rates of patients colonized by
MDR-GNB at hospital admission. In a 6-year survey (1995–
2000) in a French surgical ICU, the rates of ESBL-producing
Enterobacteriaceae colonization or infection were 0.4 new
cases per 100 admissions [136]. A study investigating coloni-
zation with A. baumannii reported that 58% of ASC collected
from newly admitted patients in an ICU with an endemic
situation were positive for MDR-A. baumannii [153].
Observational studies have identiﬁed risk factors for
colonization due to MDR-GNB at hospital admission. These
include: recent antibiotic usage, residency or recent travel in a
country with high incidence of MDR-GNB, hospitalization in a
healthcare facility where MDR-GNB are endemic, advanced
age, dialysis and residency in long-term care facilities or nursing
homes ([154], 23rd European Congress of Clinical Microbiol-
ogy and Infectious Diseases, abstract eP 697).
To try to clarify the impact of ASC in controlling the spread
of MDR-GNB within hospitalized patients, Harris et al.
suggested two key variables to be determined locally: (i)
organism-speciﬁc proportion of antibiotic resistance attribut-
able to antibiotic usage and (ii) organism-speciﬁc attributable
fraction due to patient-to-patient transmission. Deﬁning these
parameters would imply that cost-effectiveness studies could
be performed locally and used by hospital epidemiologists to
implement ASC accordingly [155]. However, as underlined by
the authors, at the moment no accurate estimates of these
parameters exist for any MDR-GNB in the non-outbreak
setting. Determining these two components becomes even
more difﬁcult where there is a community reservoir or
frequent inter-hospital transfers or re-admissions of colonized
patients requiring their thorough epidemiological tracking and
molecular typing of strains and determination of antimicrobial
resistance elements.
ASC in an epidemic setting
Several studies have provided examples of the efﬁcacy of the
ASC included in a multifaceted strategy in outbreak settings.
Enoch et al. [156] described the ineffectiveness of an approach
that did not include identiﬁcation of carriers with ASC in
controlling an outbreak of MDR-A. baumannii that occurred in
2006 in a British teaching hospital. In a second phase, a partial
ward closure with strict physical segregation of patients and
barrier nursing along with the use of ASC (3 days a week)
were introduced and these measures were effective in
containing the outbreak. In the participating ICU, almost 5%
of screened patients were found to be colonized with
MDR-A. baumannii. ASC enabled earlier detection of coloni-
zation in 25% of these carriers, saving 1–6 days before the
detection from a clinical sample [156]. Ben-David et al.
described a hospital-wide outbreak of CRE that was controlled
only after implementing an intervention that included the use
of rectal screening at admission and then weekly thereafter, in
addition to the measures taken in accordance with the national
infection control programme [125]. Notably, 52% of patients
were identiﬁed by use of ASC initially and 39% of CPs were
applied based on results of ASCs [125]. In an ICU department
in a hospital in Belgium in which routine screening (on the day
of admission and biweekly) and CP failed to prevent and
interrupt an outbreak of ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae,
reinforced infection control measures, including daily screen-
ing, controlled the outbreak without major disruption of
medical care [123].
Recommendations
Epidemic setting
Strong recommendation: Implement a programme of active
screening culture at hospital admission followed by
contact precautions to reduce the spread of extended-
spectrum b-lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae,
multidrug-resistant (MDR)-Klebsiella pneumoniae,
MDR-Acinetobacter baumannii (moderate level of
evidence); and MDR-Pseudomonas aeruginosa (very low
level of evidence)
ASC in endemic setting
A 3-year prospective, controlled, quasi-experimental study in
achieving the control of the spread of MDR-A. baumannii
infection and colonization was conducted in an endemic setting
and supported the utility of ASCs [157]. Following an increase
in the rate of MDR-A. baumannii infection and colonization in
ICUs and a coronary care unit, a multifaceted intervention
lasting 24 months, was introduced. The bundle included: (i)
implementation of enhanced CP; (ii) ASCs for MDR-A. bau-
mannii (comprising tracheal aspirates and rectal swabs, on
admission and then weekly; (iii) cohorting patients with
MDR-A. baumannii, and (iv) enhanced environmental cleaning.
Twenty-four months after the introduction of the multifaceted
strategy, the rate of colonization had decreased by 76%. As
several interventions were made simultaneously, it is impos-
sible to establish which measure was the most effective [157].
A further veriﬁcation of the efﬁcacy of the use of ASCs in
endemic settings was provided by Rodriguez-Bano et al. A
multifaceted control programme to reduce MDR-A. baumannii
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transmission included measures to improve adherence to HH,
CP and ASC at hospital admission and weekly, implementation
of environmental cleaning, and regular staff meetings. The
bundle resulted in a sustained decrease in the rate of
colonization and infection and of bacteraemia due to
MDR-A. baumannii [81].
In contrast, Barbolla et al. reported that the introduction of
ASC did not decrease cross-transmission of carbapenem-resis-
tant A. baumannii (CRAB) in endemic setting. In this study
oropharyngeal, axillary and rectal swabs were collected from
all newly admitted ICU patients at admission and then weekly.
CPs were applied in colonized and infected patients with no
effect on the rate of MDR-GNB colonization [153].
The results of interventions are also related to the type of
microorganism. A retrospective study, with pre- and post-in-
terventional phases, was carried out by Kochar et al. [122]. In
the ﬁrst period, CP for MDR-GNB-colonized or -infected
patients and ASC for CRAB at admission and weekly were
introduced. In the second phase, ASC included the identiﬁca-
tion of CRKP and CR-P. aeruginosa (CRPA). Interestingly, the
number of patients with CRAB or CRPA did not signiﬁcantly
differ in the two study periods, whereas there was a marked
decrease in the number of patients with CRKP during the
second period. Possible explanations for the lack of effect of
ASC for P. aeruginosa and A. baumannii are either that these
bacteria frequently colonize the respiratory tract, which was
not included in their screening strategy, or that the patients
were not efﬁcient reservoirs for those microorganisms [122].
After evaluation of the evidence the authors of these
guidelines agreed that the implementation of ASC should be
suggested only as an additional measure and not included in the
basic measures to control the spread of MDR-GNB in the
endemic setting.
The Role of the Environmental Cleaning to
Prevent Spread
Surface level cleanliness in healthcare environments has been
shown to be important for controlling HAIs caused by
Gram-positive microorganisms such as methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), vancomycin-resistant
enterococci and Clostridium difﬁcile [158]. Studies that demon-
strate the impact of cleaning alone for controlling GNB
microorganisms other than Acinetobacter spp., however, are
lacking, although environmental cleaning is often mentioned as
part of an overall infection control package in response to an
outbreak [158,159]. In many poorly controlled endemic
situations, the healthcare environment has never been studied
adequately and this may underestimate its importance.
Although environmental screening has been performed to
control outbreaks, its role remains contentious and the
methodology has not been standardized [160]. Unexpected
environmental reservoirs can sometimes be identiﬁed, sug-
gesting that environmental screening should be considered,
especially when control is not accomplished using basic IPC
practices [134].
It is widely believed that coliforms and Pseudomonas cannot
survive for long periods of time in dry healthcare environ-
ments and so do not pose as much of a threat as their more
robust Gram-positive counterparts [161], although there are
studies suggesting that the survival of coliforms and P. aeru-
ginosa on dry surfaces might be longer than previously thought
[162]. Acinetobacter baumannii can be recovered from the
hospital environment with ease, including inanimate hand-
touch sites near the patient [163]. Seeding clinical and
environmental strains onto Formica surfaces demonstrated
survival of between 1 and 2 weeks, although some strains are
known to survive for much longer [164]. While Acinetobacter is
known to survive in surface dust for months, organisms such
as E. coli, Klebsiella spp., Enterobacter spp. and Serratia spp., have
not generally demonstrated resilience to desiccation. How-
ever, recent reports suggest that GNB may actually display
greater survival properties than Gram-positive organisms
[162]. Escherichia coli, Klebsiella spp. and Pseudomonas spp. have
all been shown to survive for more than a year under certain
conditions, Serratia marcescens for up to 2 months and
Acinetobacter spp. for up to 5 months [162]. Pseudomonas can
survive on a dry ﬂoor for 5 weeks but little is known about
Burkholderia and Stenotrophomonas persistence in the health-
care environment other than a predilection for bioﬁlm lining
sink traps and other plumbing components. In contrast, MRSA
has been shown to survive for a year in hospital dust, the
spores of C. difﬁcile for 5 months and vancomycin-resistant
enterococci for 4 months [162,165]. Environmental screening
has recovered GNB from a variety of hospital surfaces. GNB
have also been identiﬁed on general surfaces such as ﬂoors,
shelves and ledges; curtains, linen, towels and clothes;
mattresses and beds; furniture; computers, telephones and
all items of clinical equipment [161,166–169]. Some pathogens,
notably Pseudomonas spp., can survive well in damp places such
as sinks, showers and baths. Dust-loving A. baumannii settles
on rarely cleaned and/or inaccessible surfaces such as shelves,
highly-placed equipment and computer keyboards; whereas
coliforms such as Klebsiella and Serratia favour buckets, bowls,
mops and liquids over dry surfaces [161,170].
A recent study examined a range of sites near patients
known to be usually colonised by GNB [168]. Of nearly 2000
sites sampled, only about 5% demonstrated the presence of
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isolates indistinguishable to those from the patient whose
environment was sampled [168]. Organisms identiﬁed included
Pseudomonas, Stenotrophomonas maltophilia, E. coli, Enterobacter,
Acinetobacter, Serratia and Klebsiella spp. Sites more likely to
host GNB included linen, gowns and nightwear; bedside tables,
bed rails and chairs; ﬂoors and door handles; infusion pumps
and respirators; and bathroom sites such as urinals, shower
ﬁttings, sinks and toilet seats.
Another study used standardized sampling methodology for
ten hand-touch and general sites in different wards of a
teaching hospital and conﬁrmed that 5% of environmental sites
were positive for GNB [171]. Coliforms, Pseudomonas spp. and
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia were more often recovered from
‘wet’ sites such as sinks and baths, although there was a
difference between the recovery rate of coliforms and
pseudomonads from sinks on different wards. Very few
coliforms were isolated from ICU sinks, as opposed to sinks
on medical wards, and pseudomonads were isolated more
frequently from ICU sinks than those on the medical wards.
The authors attributed this to the frequent dispensing of
disinfectants into the ICU sinks by staff engaged in hand
disinfection, particularly products containing chlorhexidine and
alcohol. All environmental GNB recovered from the ICU
environment were signiﬁcantly more resistant to antibiotics
than those from the medical wards. The study concluded that
antibiotic consumption is associated with resistance proﬁles of
organisms on ﬂoors and other surfaces within a deﬁned local
environment such as a hospital ward [171].
Previous room occupancy by a GNB-colonized or GNB-in-
fected patient has been shown to be a risk for acquisition of
GNB [135]. There are several different methods for assessing
both the efﬁcacy of cleaning and the extent of environmental
contamination in the hospital environment. Although more
evidence for cleaning in control of HAI including MDR-GNB is
still needed, it is generally agreed that maintaining a clean
environment provides a fundamental basis for all hygienic
measures in preventing infection [158]. GNB can survive on
hospital surfaces and studies have demonstrated strains that
are indistinguishable from both environmental reservoirs and
patients [172]. Given the potential role of cleaning in the
control of MDR-GNB, therefore, methods for assessing
cleanliness are needed, both for scientiﬁc studies and to
reassure staff and patients. Such methods can be deﬁned within
two main categories: process evaluation, where the cleaning
process is monitored by visual inspection or with a ﬂuorescent
gel marker; and outcome evaluation, where cleanliness is
evaluated with the use of ATP bioluminescence systems or
microbial cultures [173].
Either ﬂuorescent markers or kits for measuring organic
soil have conﬁrmed that many high-risk sites escape appropri-
ate cleaning. Auditing surfaces and equipment on a ward can
establish what is handled, how often it is handled and who has
cleaning responsibility. The results of these audits provide
basic information for manipulation of cleaning schedules,
although cleaning responsibilities and resources for any extra
cleaning hours require robust managerial support. There are
alternative methods of environmental assessment, notably
cleaning inspections; education; monitoring and feedback, all of
which encourage enhanced performance by housekeepers.
Placing invisible ﬂuorescent markers at key sites for later
inspection and feedback for domestic staff has also been shown
to improve overall cleaning compliance, along with reduction
of key hospital pathogens. Use of ATP monitoring demon-
strates pronounced effect on cleaners when they received
concomitant educational guidance. Direct observation and
supervision of staff as they clean also demonstrates reductions
of important hospital pathogens on high-risk surfaces [158].
Organisms from water outlets have the potential to
colonize and infect patients despite the lack of evidence for
speciﬁc transmission pathways. Outbreaks of P. aeruginosa and
Stenotrophomonas maltophilia have been traced to tap ﬁlters and
aerators, sink traps and drains, usually hosting adherent
bioﬁlms [174]. Sinks form a reservoir for many different
GNB [170,174–181]. Bioﬁlms also build up in sink traps
underneath the outlet. This complex living deposit on internal
plumbing surfaces hosts and protects a multitude of water-lov-
ing organisms, some of which pose a threat to nearby
debilitated patients. In addition, bacteria within bioﬁlms may
display greater capacity for antimicrobial resistance and can
tolerate chlorine and other disinfectants [182]. Bioﬁlm-forming
K. pneumoniae strains are also more likely to produce ESBLs
[183].
It is not known to what extent sink usage for HH, etc.
encourages sink contamination or aerosolization from back-
splash, but investigation of pathogens from sinks, surrounding
surfaces and patient isolates have demonstrated indistinguish-
able strains [170,174,175]. Disinfection using chlorinated
products, without disruption of bioﬁlm, only offers limited
control; a comprehensive cleaning initiative is required to
physically remove the bioﬁlm lining the surfaces of affected
plumbing components [174,184]. These are often difﬁcult to
access and require close collaboration between personnel with
hospital engineering and construction expertise.
Detergent-based cleaning might remove microbes, but will
not necessarily kill them [10]. Disinfectants are more effective
at killing pathogens than detergents but some hospital
pathogens can resist the bactericidal effect of particular agents
due to a number of resistance mechanisms [185,186]. Potential
cross-resistance between biocides and antimicrobial agents
should also be considered. No one single process will remove
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all relevant microbial soil from the hospital, despite innovative
products containing both detergent and disinfectant products.
There is substantial uncertainty regarding the impact of use of
speciﬁc disinfectants in the hospital environment, because
laboratory testing does not necessarily predict what actually
happens on hospital surfaces. Physical removal may be as
effective as using disinfectants for controlling environmental
microbes. MDR-Serratia marcescens can survive in chlorhexi-
dine and Stenotrophomonas spp. have been linked with deion-
ized water used for diluting ‘Savlon’TM concentrates containing
chlorhexidine (1–5%) and cetrimide (15%) [186]. Spray clean-
ing ﬂuids can also become contaminated with GNB, including
Enterobacter cloacae, Acinetobacter, Klebsiella and Pseudomonas
spp. [187,188]. Eight out of ten samples from alcohol-contain-
ing cleaning ﬂuids in daily hospital use were contaminated with
various GNB (mainly Pseudomonas spp.) [188]. Failure to clean
the spray containers properly on a daily basis meant that
domestic staff were effectively spraying the hospital ﬂoors with
a culture of Pseudomonas spp. Cleaning equipment may also
become contaminated with hospital pathogens and disperse
these into the hospital environment [161,189,190].
Innovative forms of cleaning and decontamination methods
for the healthcare environment are constantly appearing [158].
These have an impact on all environmental pathogens,
including spore-forming bacilli, but robust evidence supporting
their use for the control of MDR-GNB is lacking. There are
novel disinfectants such as electrolysed water, and automated
systems dispelling steam, hydrogen peroxide, ozone and
different types of UV light. Studies to evaluate the impact of
antimicrobial surfaces, such as steel, copper, silver and
nano-silver particles combined with light-activated titanium
dioxide have demonstrated equivocal results on environmental
contamination [191–196]. However, traditional cleaning meth-
ods should not be relaxed or abandoned even if new cleaning
systems are introduced as problems have occurred with some
of the methods mentioned [191,197–208].
EC in epidemic setting
The best evidence for cleaning is found in the studies on the
prevention or control of outbreaks of Acinetobacter spp. [209–
211]. One study provided a strong indication for the role of
cleaning during an outbreak caused by MDR-A. baumannii
involving more than 30 patients in two ICUs [209]. ICU
environmental contamination was recognized as an important
reservoir for this epidemic strain. The outbreak ceased only
after the ICUs were closed for complete cleaning and
disinfection. Another study examined the levels of environ-
mental contamination with A. baumannii in a neurosurgical ICU
during a prolonged outbreak [163]. As with MRSA and
C. difﬁcile, there were many near-patient hand-touch sites that
yielded the epidemic strain. This study also demonstrated a
signiﬁcant association between the amount of environmental
contamination and patient colonization. The conclusion was
that high standards of cleaning play an integral role in
controlling outbreaks of Acinetobacter in the ICU.
Acinetobacter can also be a persistent problem for burn
patients [212]. Following an increase in Acinetobacter infection
rates among paediatric burns patients, an environmental
screening programme recovered the organism from various
surfaces in the patients’ rooms including the plastic covers
shielding the bedside computer keyboards. IPC measures that
included donning of gloves before using computers and
thorough disinfection of these plastic covers effectively
terminated the outbreak [212].
Although environmental cleaning interventions have been
performed mainly to control outbreaks due to MDR-A. bau-
mannii—albeit with controversial results—the literature also
includes reports of outbreaks of coliforms, pseudomonads
and Stenotrophomonas spp. traced to discrete pieces of
equipment, environmental sites or possibly speciﬁc cleaning
practice failures [151,161]. Identiﬁcation and eradication of
the reservoir appeared to terminate the various outbreaks
caused by a wide range of MDR-GNB [170,174–
181,189,213,214]. The interventions have been many and
some involved the introduction or changing of a cleaning
regimen or complete removal of one or more suspected
items of equipment.
Recommendations
Epidemic setting
Strong recommendation: Monitor cleaning performance to
ensure consistent environmental cleaning (EC). Vacate
units for intensive cleaning. Implement regular EC
procedures and, when available, dedicate non-critical
medical items for use on individual patients colonized or
infected with extended-spectrum b-lactamase
Enterobacteriaceae and multidrug-resistant-Acinetobacter
baumannii (moderate level of evidence)
EC in endemic setting
There is little evidence for the role of cleaning for controlling
MDR-GNB in situations other than those of outbreaks
[215,216]. Staff working in an 11-bed ICU received an educa-
tional intervention to improveHH and EC [217]. This resulted in
a decrease in the number of patients colonized with ESBL-En-
terobacteriaceae from 70% during a 3-month pre-intervention
period to 40% during a post-intervention period. This study was
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uncontrolled, however, comprised two interventions, and it is
possible that the initial high proportion of colonized patients
actually represented an underlying outbreak [217].
Interventions including EC and removal of potentially
contaminated equipment as components of a bundle of IPC
practices were performed in endemic settings for MDR-A. bau-
mannii [212,214], ESBL-producing GNB [213] and
MDR-K. pneumoniae [179] but with different results. Following
the identiﬁcation of a CRKP in a district general hospital in the
UK, cleaning of the ward using a chlorine-based agent was
carried out and patient-related items were cleaned at least
once a day by nursing staff [218]. Enhanced cleaning was only
part of the overall infection control package, however, along
with the use of a urinary catheter care bundle; patient note
tagging; HH emphasis; and CP for patient cases.
Recommendations
Endemic setting
Strong recommendation: Implement regular environmental
cleaning (EC) procedures and, when available, dedicate
non-critical medical items for use on individual patients
colonized or infected with multidrug-resistant-
Acinetobacter baumannii (moderate level of evidence)
The Role of Antimicrobial Stewardship to
Prevent Spread
Numerous papers have demonstrated that previous
antimicrobial drug exposure is a strong risk factor for
colonization and infection due to drug-resistant bacteria
[219–222]. Fluoroquinolones and third-generation cephalo-
sporins have often been implicated in promoting the spread of
MDR-bacteria [220–222], although, the direct association
between antibiotic therapy and the acquisition of antibi-
otic-resistant bacteria is still unclear. The studies are often
confounded by scarce data on antibiotic usage and differ
according to microorganism, dosage, drug combinations,
timing of exposure and setting. A recent Cochrane systematic
review showed that interventions to reduce excessive
antibiotic prescribing to hospital inpatients can reduce
antimicrobial resistance or hospital-acquired infections and
interventions to increase effective prescribing can improve
clinical outcome [223].
One of the earlier illustrations of the efﬁcacy of antibiotic
intervention is the work by Gerding et al. who, to address high
rates of gentamicin resistance among GNB, substituted
amikacin for gentamicin in the hospital formulary at two
separate points in a 10-year time period at the Minneapolis
Veterans Affairs Medical Center [224]. A retrospective review
of this 10-year period revealed a signiﬁcant decline in the rate
of gentamicin resistance among GNB following each substitu-
tion.
More recently, Ntagiopoulos et al. investigated the inﬂu-
ence of an antibiotic policy programme based on the
restriction of the empirical use of ﬂuoroquinolones and
ceftazidime on the susceptibilities of GNB in a general ICU in
Greece. After a 24-month period of protocol application,
consumption of both restricted antibiotics and antibiotics in
general were reduced by 92% and 55%, respectively. Suscep-
tibilities to ciproﬂoxacin of the three predominant infec-
tion-causing GNB increased signiﬁcantly. No differences were
observed in overall mortality and type of infections between
colonizing and infecting strains [225].
In another study from Turkey, a nationwide antibiotic
restriction programme was evaluated for its effect on antibi-
otic consumption, antimicrobial resistance and costs. The data
obtained from four university hospitals, and one referral
tertiary-care educational state hospital were included in the
analysis. Antimicrobial resistance proﬁles of 14 233 selected
microorganisms causing bacteraemia and antibiotic consump-
tion were analysed, retrospectively. A negative correlation was
observed between ceftriaxone consumption and the preva-
lence of ceftriaxone-resistant E. coli and Klebsiella spp. The
decreased usage of carbapenems was correlated with
decreased CRPA and CRAB [226].
Interesting studies on the impact of an ABS programme on
antimicrobial resistance were those performed to reduce the
morbidity of C. difﬁcile diarrhoea. In a study by Malani et al.
[227] in which there was a review of 510 antimicrobial orders,
implementation of an ABS programme was associated with a
50% reduction in the likelihood of developing C. difﬁcile
infection, and with a 25.4% drop in deﬁned daily doses of
the target antimicrobials. There is also increasing evidence to
suggest that appropriate antibiotic use can decrease the
incidence of MDR-GNB [228,229], even though data are
controversial [230].
There are different approaches to the control and limiting of
antibiotics consumption in hospitalized patients. Antibiotic
restriction, i.e. the requirement for approval of the antibiotic
from an infectious diseases specialist might be one of the most
effective control methods [231,232]. A variety of such use-jus-
tiﬁcation approaches have been designed to improve antibiotic
use. These have included telephone approval from an infectious
diseases specialist, automatic stop orders, and antibiotic order
forms that require justiﬁcation for the prescribed drug after
dispensing from the pharmacy. At the Indiana University Medical
Center a prior approval programme resulted in decreased
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enterococcal and GNB bacteraemia as well as fewer infections
due to Stenotrophomonas maltophilia and MRSA [233].
Kollef et al. [234] studied the effects of a scheduled change
in empiric antibiotic coverage of suspected GNB infection
from ceftazidime to ciproﬂoxacin in 680 patients who had
undergone cardiac surgery during two 6-month periods. The
study revealed a signiﬁcant reduction of 42% in the incidence
of ventilator-associated pneumonia, presumably as the result
of a signiﬁcant reduction in pneumonia caused by MDR-GNB.
Additionally Kollef et al. were able to demonstrate improved
antibiotic susceptibility proﬁles for Gram-negative isolates
(49% resistant before intervention versus 20% after) but did
not demonstrate a difference in crude mortality (5% versus
8%) or mortality attributed to ventilator-associated pneumonia
caused by MDR-GNB [234].
Antibiotic cycling or rotating (i.e. the scheduled alternation
of various classes of antibiotics) has been described as an
important strategy for decreasing resistance. The goal of
antibiotic cycling or rotation is a sustainable decline or
stabilization in antimicrobial resistance through successive,
prospective alterations in antibiotic selection pressures that
prevent the selection of speciﬁc resistance traits and hence,
organisms. Indeed, cycling of antibiotics in high-risk units can
successfully modify resistance patterns and the concept of
cycling is theoretically compelling [235,236]. Its usefulness,
however, may be limited because of concerns about practical
applicability and the durability of resistance genes [237,238].
Important unresolved issues include determining the superi-
ority of site-speciﬁc versus organism-speciﬁc rotation strat-
egies, optimal duration of rotation periods, types of
antibiotics used and in what order, and analysis of the
transmissibility of resistance elements in the various clones
on the units. Additional issues relate to whether rotation
could be effective also in units with low rates of resistance
and if it is possible to measure the ‘optimal density of
antibiotic use’ (i.e. number of doses/patient admissions or
days) that could be used to guide formulation of rotation
strategies [239].
The implementation of antibiotic guidelines or protocols
has been shown to be a formal means of achieving the goals
of appropriate antibiotic use, limiting unnecessary antibiotic
use and, as a result, improving antibiotic susceptibility
proﬁles [240]. Computer software has the potential to
assist in the appropriate choice of antibiotics. Although
computerized decision-support systems are not available at
many institutions, they should be considered as a paradigm
for the design of other computer-based interventions
[241,242]. In an Australian ICU the impact of the imple-
mentation of a computerized antibiotic decision support was
assessed over a 7-year period on the resistance patterns of
the most common clinically isolated GNB. The authors
reported a signiﬁcant improvement in susceptibility of
P. aeruginosa to imipenem (18% per year) and gentamicin
(12% per year) compared with the pre-intervention trend.
Signiﬁcant changes in the rates of gentamicin and ciproﬂox-
acin susceptibility were also observed in the inducible
Enterobacteriaceae group, although these were less clinically
signiﬁcant [243].
One of the major issues when planning an intervention to
reduce inappropriate usage of antibiotics within healthcare
facilities is that clinical studies have often been limited by
selection biases, small sample sizes, limitation to single
institutions, inadequate pre-observation and post-observation
datum points, and failure to deal with confounders. As pointed
out by McGowan and Tenover, studies that demonstrate
improved susceptibilities following a reduction in antibiotic use
should be conﬁrmed through multicentre prospective trials
that adjust for common confounding factors, especially
heightened IPC efforts and biases [244].
The aforementioned strategies can be incorporated into
comprehensive programmes, designed to optimize antimicro-
bial therapy, to improve patient outcomes, ensure cost-effec-
tive therapy and reduce the adverse effects associated with
antimicrobial use, including antimicrobial resistance. However,
a few studies included in their outcomes the evaluation of the
impact of an ABS programme on the resistance rate levels.
When ABS is implemented in response to the emergence of
resistance in a facility, in a multifaceted intervention, it is
difﬁcult to determine exactly what resulted in the decrease in
the emergence of resistance.
ABS in epidemic setting
A broad programme of restriction of selected antibiotics was
implemented at a large urban teaching hospital in Houston,
Texas, USA after an outbreak of a highly resistant A. bau-
mannii [245]. Prior authorization from the Infectious Disease
Service was required before orders for amikacin, ceftazidime,
ciproﬂoxacin and ticarcillin/clavulanate were ﬁlled by the
pharmacy. Ceftriaxone use was not restricted and its use
increased. As a result of the restriction programme, suscep-
tibility rates to all b-lactam and quinolone antibiotics
increased, with the greatest improvements seen in the areas
of highest use. It is not clear why ceftriaxone susceptibility
improved despite its increased use. A computerized pro-
gramme to restrict third-generation cephalosporin use was
introduced for a period of 9 months in a 750-bed university
hospital in Korea where a sudden hospital-wide increase of
ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae was detected. This system
automatically stopped the prescription of these antibiotics if
an infectious disease specialist did not approve the prescrip-
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tion. Third-generation cephalosporin use decreased signiﬁ-
cantly whereas use of carbapenems and b-lactam/b-lactamase
inhibitors increased from pre-intervention to intervention
periods. The proportion of ESBL-producing K. pneumoniae
isolates increased signiﬁcantly from 8.1% in the pre-interven-
tion period to 32.0% of intervention, and then decreased
again to 20.6% during a further 9 months of post-interven-
tion. Interestingly, no signiﬁcant increase in the proportion of
imipenem and piperacillin-tazobactam resistance among
P. aeruginosa and A. baumannii was observed. The most
important limitation of the study was the lack of consistency
in assessing the cause–effect relationship between antibiotic
restriction and resistance proportions due to the statistical
model (before–after study instead of interrupted time series)
and lack of adjustment for confounders [246].
Recommendations
Epidemic setting
Strong recommendation: Implement an antimicrobial
stewardship programme. Plan interventions of restriction
of antibiotic usage to reduce the spread of extended-
spectrum b-lactamase-producing Enterobacteriaceae
(moderate level of evidence)
ABS in endemic setting
Lautenbach et al. [247], in a study performed at two hospitals
within the University of Pennsylvania Health System,
observed that the association between previous quinolone
use and ﬂuoroquinolone-resistant E. coli colonization varied
signiﬁcantly by study year, suggesting that the clinical
epidemiology of resistant organisms may have changed over
time. No substantive changes were reported in the antimi-
crobial formulary or IPC protocols in the two study hospitals
during the investigation. A 5-year quasi-experimental study
was conducted in two hospitals to examine variations across
hospitals in the response to antimicrobial interventions (i.e.
restriction of ceftazidime and ceftriaxone) designed to curb
the spread of ESBL-producing E. coli and K. pneumoniae. After
the interventions, the prevalence of ESBL-producing bacteria
decreased by different degrees in the two centres. The effect
of antimicrobial formulary interventions seemed to vary
substantially across institutions, perhaps as a result of
differences in patient populations. The results suggest vari-
ability in the epidemiological proﬁles of ESBL-positive isolates
at different hospitals [247]. A time-series analysis showed a
temporal relationship between antimicrobial use and resis-
tance [248]. Restriction of cephalosporins was associated
with a decrease in the rate of cephalosporin-resistant
Klebsiella species by 44% [249,250] and a 69% increase in
imipenem resistance among P. aeruginosa. Under these
circumstances, an open formulary could have prevented the
dominant use of a single class of antibiotics and the
emergence of resistance to that class, a phenomenon dubbed
‘squeezing the resistance balloon’ by Burke [251]. Rahal et al.
concluded that antibiotic formulary restriction may positively
affect antimicrobial susceptibility patterns, but alone it may
also decrease the heterogeneity of antibiotic use and,
consequently, enhance resistance. The investigators, there-
fore, postulated later that ‘the resistance balloon can and
should be squeezed at multiple sites’ [252].
Recommendations
Endemic setting
Strong recommendation: Implement an antimicrobial
stewardship programme to reduce the spread of
extended-spectrum b-lactamase-producing Enterobac-
teriaceae (moderate level of evidence)
The Role of Decolonization and Topical
Chlorhexidine to Reduce Spread
Decolonization regimens have been extensively studied in
patients colonized with MRSA while only a few clinical trials
focused on ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae [24,136,253–
255]. Recently the ﬁrst randomized, placebo-controlled
clinical trial has been conducted in Switzerland to evaluate
the efﬁcacy of a systematic ESBL-producing Enterobacteria-
ceae eradication strategy including colistin sulphate (50 mg
four times daily) and neomycin sulphate (250 mg four times
daily) for 10 days plus nitrofurantoin (100 mg three times
daily) for 5 days. Among 54 patients included in the primary
analysis, there was no statistically signiﬁcant difference
between the groups with regard to the detection of
ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae by rectal swab 28+7 days
after the end of treatment. The regimen temporarily
suppressed ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae carriage, but
had no long-term effect.
Saidel-Odes et al. performed a randomized placebo-con-
trolled trial using oral gentamicin and polymyxin E gel (0.5 g
four times daily) plus oral solutions of gentamicin (80 mg four
times daily) and polymyxin E (1 9 106 units four times daily)
for 7 days to eradicate CRKP oropharyngeal and gastrointes-
tinal carriage. The percentages of rectal cultures that were
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negative for CRKP were signiﬁcantly reduced at 2 weeks
(16.1% in the placebo arm versus 61.1% in the decolonization
arm; OR = 0.13; 95% CI, 0.02–0.74) while the reduction at
week 6 (33.3% versus 58.5%) was not signiﬁcant [256].
Available evidence does not enable the authors of these
guidelines to provide recommendations on the usage of
decolonization protocols to limit the spread of MDR-GNB
among hospitalized patients. Further studies are needed to
deﬁne the microbiological target, patient populations, and risk
of development of resistance.
Chlorhexidine gluconate is an antiseptic agent with broad
antimicrobial activity. Daily bathing of patients with
chlorhexidine has been used to decrease the burden of
VRE on patients’ skin, HCWs’ hands and environmental
surfaces, and observational studies have demonstrated
decreased risks for MRSA acquisition associated with routine
cleansing of ICU patients with chlorhexidine [257]. Two
recently published cluster-randomized studies assessed the
impact of strategies involving daily cleansing of ICU patients
with 2% chlorhexidine gluconate-impregnated bathing cloths
[258,259]. Although both studies demonstrated a signiﬁcant
reduction in ICU-associated bloodstream infection rates
associated with universal chlorhexidine cleansing, Climo et al.
did not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant impact on bloodstream
infections due to GNB and Huang et al. did not speciﬁcally
assess Gram-negative bloodstream infection risk [258,259].
Although chlorhexidine bathing has also been used as a
strategy to prevent acquisition of MDR-GNB in both the
endemic and outbreak settings, the few studies that have
evaluated the impact of chlorhexidine bathing on MDR-GNB
have been single-centre, observational studies, and often
include other simultaneously implemented interventions
aimed at preventing MDR-GNB transmission. One study
assessed the impact of daily bathing of patients admitted to a
trauma centre’s ICU with 2% chlorhexidine gluco-
nate-impregnated bathing cloths, and found a non-statistically
signiﬁcant decrease in risk for colonization with A. baumannii
[260]. Daily bathing with 2% chlorhexidine has also been
used as one component of successful bundled interventions
used to control outbreaks of CRKP in long-term acute care
hospitals and ICUs [261,262].
Reduced susceptibility to chlorhexidine has been reported
among GNB [263], so sustained use of topical chlorhexidine as
a strategy to limit transmission of MDR-GNB should ideally be
accompanied by surveillance for the emergence of chlorhex-
idine resistance over time.
Available evidence does not enable the authors to derive
strong recommendations for the wide application of chlorh-
exidine in hospitalized patients colonized or infected with
MDR-GNB.
The Role of Infrastructure and Education to
Reduce the Spread
A few papers included improvement of infrastructure in a
multifaceted approach to reduce the spread of MDR-GNB.
The most interesting example was reported from Israel
where the authors controlled a national outbreak of
MDR-K. pneumoniae with a multifaceted approach including
contact isolation measures and placement of patients carrying
CRE in self-contained nursing units staffed by dedicated
nurses, and isolation of known carriers at subsequent
hospitalization. Importantly, mandatory reporting to public
health authorities of every CRE patient and mandatory
isolation of those hospitalized were introduced. Furthermore,
compliance with isolation measures was monitored through-
out the country by a central authority. Finally a Task Force
on Antimicrobial Resistance and Infection Control was
created that reported directly to the Ministry of Health
Deputy Director-General. The task force was invested with
the statutory authority to intervene as necessary to contain
the outbreak [127]. Although limited evidence was available
for such a generalization, the authors conclude that admin-
istrative support, including economic and human resources,
was essential to prevent and control MDR-GNB at a global
level.
Public health resources should support the initiation of IPC
interventions within hospitals. An IPC infrastructure should
include environmental personnel, such as estates, domestic
and janitorial representatives. National health programmes
should include a speciﬁc economic plan to support hospitals
with high-endemic MDR-GNB, providing resources for ade-
quate stafﬁng and training. The local application of IPC
measures should be supported by management of the health-
care facility by providing administrative and ﬁnancial resources
(World Health Organization. Available at http://www.who.int/
csr/resources/publications/WHO_HSE_EPR_2009_1/en/).
Education becomes even more important as a key core
component to help reduce the transmission of MDR-GNB in
endemic or epidemic settings. There have been many inter-
ventions to reinforce HCWs’ knowledge of the importance of
IPC in outbreak settings. These have included educational
programmes ranging from local-unit to hospital-wide training
and from a few modules to daily staff meetings. Regular
education meetings held every 2–4 weeks with physicians,
nurses, physical therapists and students working in affected
areas were part of an effective bundle used to control endemic
A. baumannii in one study [81]. Diverse groups of practitioners
and professionals, i.e. doctors, nurses, respiratory technicians,
pharmacists and environmental service personnel need to be
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educated on core components of infection prevention and the
pivotal role that these play in preventing transmission of
MDR-GNB. In a study conducted in a mixed ICU of an
American 300-bed tertiary-care hospital, meetings were held
with the infection control and nursing staff to encourage strict
adherence to the ICP measures, including rectal surveillance
cultures, extensive EC and cohorting patients and staff. The
combined intervention was effective in reducing the incidence
of endemic CRKP [122]. During an outbreak of ESBL-produc-
ing K. pneumoniae, every day meetings between the ICU and
infection control teams were held to reinforce infarction
control measures previously failing to control the epidemic.
This intervention included in a multifaceted approach con-
trolled the outbreak in 50 days [123].
Inter-professional education should facilitate learning new
practices together in a team setting, increasing likelihood of
uptake of the new practice behaviours, and greater under-
standing of team member roles. In particular, evidence-
based interventions, combined with adaptive strategies and
behaviour change management processes, could help the
healthcare team to produce state-of-the-art infection preven-
tion practices.
Recommendations
Epidemic setting
Strong recommendation: Conduct educational
programmes to ensure that healthcare workers
understand why extended-spectrum b-lactamase-
Enterobacteriaceae are important epidemiologically, why
prevention of spread is critical for control, and which
measures for preventing spread have proven to be
effective (moderate level of evidence)
Endemic setting
Strong recommendation: Conduct educational
programmes to ensure that healthcare workers
understand why multidrug-resistant-Acinetobacter
baumannii is important epidemiologically, why prevention
of spread is critical for control, and which measures for
preventing spread have proven to be effective (moderate
level of evidence)
Recommendations
Recommendations are presented according to epidemio-
logical setting (endemic versus epidemic situations) and
differentiated into: ‘basic’ practices recommended for all
acute-care facilities, and ‘additional special approaches’ to be
considered when there is still clinical and/or epidemiological
and/or molecular evidence of ongoing transmission regard-
less of the application of these basic measures. Hospitals
should consider adopting one or more of these additional
measures according to the local epidemiology and patients’
comorbidities.
The evidence on basic practices was extracted from
literature that had mainly reported the control of hospital
spread of MDR-GNB in ‘endemic’ situations, whereas the
evidence for the additional measures was mainly taken from
‘outbreak’ control reports. Recommendations are presented
according to endemic and epidemic situations (see Table 1
for deﬁnitions), as literature differed in strategies shown to
be effective, according to the situation and are also
presented, where possible, by MDR-GNB type. When the
evidence was derived from studies not providing results by
type of microorganism, the level of evidence and recom-
mendations are provided referring to MDR-GNB. The level
of evidence (very low/low/moderate/strong) and strength of
recommendation (conditional/strong) are deﬁned according
to the GRADE approach (available from: http://www.grade-
workinggroup.org). Where the level of evidence and
recommendations are not provided it means that no
scientiﬁc evidence was available.
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate the GRADE approach and speciﬁc
deﬁnitions for determinants of quality and evidence that were
applied to extract the ﬁnal recommendation. The cumulative
level of the evidence stratiﬁed by microorganisms and type of
intervention is shown in Tables 4–9.
The authors would like to point out that the revision of
evidence clearly shows ‘grey’ areas where studies with
appropriate design are urgently needed: CP for high-risk
patients (i.e. haematological or ICU patients) colonized or
infected with ESBL-producing E. coli, cohorting of patients
and staff, and ABS programme. The authors also underline
that since the current review was not able to produce
speciﬁc indications stratiﬁed by patients’ risk, because of
the lack of evidence, the application of these guidelines to
high-risk patients, e.g. ICU patients, burn patients, or
haematological patients, should be carefully locally evalu-
ated according to ecology and patients’ comorbidities.
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TABLE 4. Quality of studies by intervention. Basic measures to reduce the spread of multidrug-resistant
(MDR)-Klebsiella pneumoniae and extended-spectrum b-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Enterobacteriaceae in
hospitalized adult patients: recommended for all acute-care facilities in endemic setting
Microorganism MDR-K. pneumoniae ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae
Intervention
Quality of studies [ref.] Overall
quality
of
evidence
Quality of studies [ref.]
Overall quality
of evidenceModerate Low
Very
low Moderate Low
Very
low
Hand hygiene 2 [122,265] – – Moderate 2 [137,266] 1 [267] – Moderate
Education 1 [122] – – Moderate 1 [266] 1 [267] – Moderate
Contact
precautions
2 [122,265] – – Moderate 3 [136,137,266] 1 [267] – Moderate
Isolation room 1 [265] – – Moderate 1 [137] 1 [267] – Moderate
Environmental
cleaning
2 [122,265] – – Moderate 1 [137] – – Moderate
Antimicrobial
stewardship
1 [268] 1 [269] – Moderate 4 [136,268,270,271] 2 [267,272] 1 [273] Moderate
TABLE 5. Quality of studies by intervention. Basic measures to reduce the spread of multidrug-resistant (MDR)-Aci-
netobacter baumannii andMDR-Pseudomonas aeruginosa in hospitalized adult patients: recommended for all acute-care
facilities in endemic setting
Microorganism MDR-A. baumannii MDR-P. aeruginosa
Intervention
Quality of studies Overall
quality
of
evidence
Quality of studies Overall
quality
of
evidenceModerate Low
Very
low Moderate Low
Very
low
Hand hygiene 4 [81,122,153,157] 1 [274] – Moderate 2 [122,275] 1 [274] – Moderate
Education 4 [81,122,153,157] 1 [274] – Moderate 1 [122] 1 [274] – Moderate
Contact precautions 4 [81,122,153,157] – – Moderate 1 [122] – – Moderate
Isolation room 1 [81] – – Moderate – – – Insufﬁcient
Environmental
cleaning
4 [81,122,153,157] – – Moderate 1 [122] – – Moderate
Antimicrobial
stewardship
1 [268] 2 [269,272] – Moderate 2 [268,275] 2 [269,272] – Moderate
TABLE 6. Quality of studies by intervention. Basic measures to reduce the spread of Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
and Burkholderia cepacia in hospitalized adult patients: recommended for all acute-care facilities in endemic setting
Microorganism S. maltophilia B. cepacia
Intervention
Quality of studies
Overall quality
of evidence
Quality of studies
Overall quality
of evidenceModerate Low Very low Moderate Low Very low
Hand hygiene – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Education – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Contact precautions – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Isolation room – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Environmental cleaning – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Antimicrobial stewardship – 1 [272] – Low – – – Insufﬁcient
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Basic recommendations in endemic situation: ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene
(HH)
Moderate Strong Implement HH education programmes to reduce the
transmission of ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae. HCWs
should be encouraged to perform HH with an
alcohol-based hand rub before and after all patient
contacts. Soap and water hand washing is required
when hands are visibly soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or
excretions. Monitoring of HH compliance and feedback
to HCWs should be performed to achieve greater
compliance. Detailed indications on how to monitor
and improve HH compliance are provided by the WHO
guidelines (level of recommendation ranked as IA–IB)
(available from: http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/
9789241597906/en/). The use of artiﬁcial nails should
be prohibited.
Contact
precautions
(CP) (with the
exception of
Escherichia coli)1
Moderate Strong Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all
hospital settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition.
HCWs caring for patients colonized or infected with
ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae should wear gloves and
gowns before entering the room and should remove
TABLE 9. Quality of studies by intervention. Basic and additional measures to reduce the spread of Stenotroph-
omonas maltophilia and Burkholderia cepacia in hospitalized adult patients: recommended for all acute-care
facilities in epidemic setting
Microorganism S. maltophilia B. cepacia
Intervention
Quality of studies Overall
quality
of
evidence
Quality of studies
Overall
quality of
evidenceModerate Low
Very
low Moderate Low Very low
Hand hygiene 1 [315] – – Moderate – 1 [316] 2 [317,318] Very low
Education 1 [315] – – Moderate – 1 [88] 1 [318] Very low
Active surveillance cultures – – – Insufﬁcient – – 1 [319] Very low
Healthcare workers
screening
– – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Contact precautions 1 [315] – – Moderate – 2 [88,320] 1 [317] Low
Isolation room – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Pre-emptive CP/alert code – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Cohort patients – – – Insufﬁcient – 1 [316] – Low
Cohort staff – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
Environmental cleaning 1 [315] – – Moderate – 1 [320] 4 [317–319,321] Very low
Environmental screening 1 [315] – – Moderate – 3 [88,316,320] 4 [317–319,321] Very low
Antimicrobial stewardship – – – Insufﬁcient – – – Insufﬁcient
CP, contact precautions.
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Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
these promptly after care and then perform HH. There
should be audit of adherence to CP to ensure that
interventions are being correctly performed to increase
the chances of success. There is no evidence available
to provide recommendation on when to discontinue
CP and for, or against the implementation of droplet
precautions when entering the room of patients
receiving CP.
Alert code
(previous
positive) and
pre- emptive CP
(with the
exception of
E. coli)1
Moderate Conditional Use alert code to identify promptly patients already
known as colonized at, hospital/ward admission and
perform screening and pre-emptive CP. Implement
pre-emptive CP for patients admitted from ICU or
other wards with cases of ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae
already detected.
Isolation room
(with the
exception of
E. coli)1
Moderate Conditional Isolate colonized and infected patients in a single room
to reduce the risk of acquisition of ESBL+
Enterobacteriaceae. The implementation of isolation
room should include monitoring for possible
deleterious effects, such as clinical complications due to
the reduction in contacts with doctors and nurses,
decreases in the quality of life, and possible
psychological adverse effects.
Education Moderate Conditional Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae are
important epidemiologically, why prevention of spread
is critical for control, and which measures for
preventing spread have proven to be effective. Ensure
regular multidisciplinary meetings to implement
interventions, to review adherence audit and to report
local data and feedback to all HCWs and other relevant
staff.
Environmental
cleaning (EC)
Moderate Conditional Implement regular EC procedures, which include
detergents or disinfectants, depending on local practice
in order to reduce the transmission rate. Ensure
cleaning of patient care equipment and the
environment. When available, dedicate non-critical
medical items for use on individual patients colonized
or infected with ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae. Shared
equipment should be disinfected between use on
different patients.
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Antimicrobial
stewardship
(ABS)
Moderate Strong Implement an ABS programme. Consider interventions
that limit the use of speciﬁc antimicrobial agents based
on the patients’ comorbidities.
Infection
prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
NA There is no evidence available to provide
recommendations for, or against, the intervention.
However, the authors suggest provision of
administrative support, including economic and human
resources, to prevent and control
ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae transmission within the
healthcare facility. Use public health resources to
support the initiation of IPC interventions within
hospitals. An IPC infrastructure should include
environmental personnel, such as estates, domestic and
janitorial representatives.
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase; HCW, healthcare worker; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NA, not available. 1In high-risk
areas such as intensive-care units (ICU), burn units and haematological units there is no evidence in favour or against the
implementation of CP in patients colonized or infected with ESBL-producing Escherichia coli.
Basic recommendations in endemic situation: MDR-Klebsiella pneumoniae
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene
(HH)
Moderate Strong Implement HH education programmes to reduce the
transmission of MDR-K. pneumoniae. HCWs should be
encouraged to perform HH with an alcohol-based hand
rub before and after all patient contacts. Soap and
water hand washing is required when hands are visibly
soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or excretions. Monitoring of
HH compliance and feedback to HCWs should be
performed to achieve greater compliance. Detailed
indications on how to monitor and improve HH
compliance are provided by the WHO guidelines (level
of recommendation ranked as IA-IB) (available from:
http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/9789241597906/
en/). The use of artiﬁcial nails should be prohibited.
Contact
precautions
(CP)
Moderate Strong Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all
hospital settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition.
HCWs caring for patients colonized or infected with
MDR-K. pneumoniae should wear gloves and gowns
before entering the room and should remove these
promptly after care and then perform HH. There
should be audit of adherence to CP to ensure that
interventions are being correctly performed to increase
the chances of success. There is no evidence available
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to provide recommendation on when to discontinue
CP and for, or against, the implementation of droplet
precautions when entering the room of patients
receiving CP.
Alert code
(previous
positive) and
pre-emptive CP
Moderate Conditional Use alert code to identify promptly patients already
known as colonized at hospital/ward admission and
perform screening and pre-emptive CP.
Isolation room Moderate Strong Isolate colonized and infected patients in a single room to
reduce the risk of acquisition of MDR-K. pneumoniae.
The implementation of isolation room should include
monitoring for possible deleterious effects, such as
clinical complications due to the reduction in contacts
with doctors and nurses, decreases in the quality of life,
and possible psychological adverse effects.
Education Moderate Conditional Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why MDR-K. pneumoniae is important
epidemiologically, why prevention of spread is critical
for control, and which measures for preventing spread
have proven to be effective. Ensure regular
multidisciplinary meetings to implement interventions,
to review adherence audit, to report local data and
feedback to all HCWs and other relevant staff.
Environmental
cleaning (EC)
Moderate Conditional Implement regular EC procedures, which include
detergents or disinfectants, depending on local practice
to reduce the transmission rate. Ensure cleaning of
patient care equipment and the environment. When
available, dedicate non-critical medical items for use on
individual patients colonized or infected with
MDR-K. pneumoniae. Shared equipment should be
disinfected between use on different patients.
Antimicrobial
stewardship
(ABS)
Moderate Conditional Implement an ABS programme. Consider interventions
that limit the use of speciﬁc antimicrobial agents based
on patients’ case-mix.
Infection
prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommenda-
tions for, or against, the intervention. However, the
authors suggest provision of administrative support,
including economic and human resources, to prevent
and control MDR-K. pneumoniae transmission within
the healthcare facility. Use public health resources to
support the initiation of IPC interventions within
hospitals. An IPC infrastructure should include
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environmental personnel, such as estates, domestic and
janitorial representatives.
HCW, healthcare worker; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NA, not available.
Basic recommendations in endemic situation: MDR-Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene
(HH)
Moderate Strong Implement HH education programmes to reduce the
transmission of MDR-P. aeruginosa. HCWs should be
encouraged to perform HH with an alcohol-based hand
rub before and after all patient contacts. Soap and
water hand washing is required when hands are visibly
soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or excretions. Monitoring of
HH compliance and feedback to HCWs should be
performed to achieve greater compliance. Detailed
indications on how to monitor and improve HH
compliance are provided by the WHO guidelines (level
of recommendation ranked as IA-IB) (available from:
http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/9789241597906/
en/). The use of artiﬁcial nails should be prohibited.
Contact
precautions
(CP)
Moderate Strong Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all
hospital settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition.
HCWs caring for patients colonized or infected with
MDR-P. aeruginosa should wear gloves and gowns
before entering the room and should remove these,
promptly after care and then perform HH. There
should be audit of adherence to CP to ensure that
interventions are being correctly performed to increase
the chances of success. There is no evidence available
to provide recommendations on when to discontinue
CP and for, or against, the implementation of droplet
precautions when entering the room of patients
receiving CP.
Alert code
(previous
positive) and
pre-emptive CP
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommenda-
tions for, or against, the intervention.
Isolation room NA Conditional Regardless of the availability of evidence speciﬁcally
related to P. aeruginosa, the authors of these guidelines
believed that there was sufﬁcient evidence for the value
of an isolation room as demonstrated for other
microorganisms, including other MDR microorganisms,
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to also recommend this approach here until studies
show otherwise.
Education Moderate Conditional Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why P. aeruginosa is important epidemio-
logically, why prevention of spread is critical for
control, and which measures for preventing spread
have proven to be effective. Ensure regular
multidisciplinary meetings to implement interventions,
to review adherence audit, to report local data and
feedback to all HCWs and other relevant staff.
Environmental
cleaning (EC)
Moderate Conditional Implement regular EC procedures, which include
detergents or disinfectants, depending on local practice
to reduce the transmission rate. Ensure cleaning of
patient care equipment and the environment. When
available, dedicate non-critical medical items for use on
individual patients colonized or infected with
MDR-P. aeruginosa. Shared equipment should be
disinfected between use on different patients.
Antimicrobial
stewardship
(ABS)
Moderate Conditional Implement an ABS programme. Consider interventions
that limit the use of speciﬁc antimicrobial agents based
on patients’ case-mix.
Infection
prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommen-
dations for, or against, the intervention. However, the
authors suggest provision of administrative support,
including economic and human resources, to prevent
and control MDR-P. aeruginosa transmission within the
healthcare facility. Use public health resources to
support the initiation of IPC interventions within
hospitals. An IPC infrastructure should include
environmental personnel such as estates, domestic and
janitorial representatives.
HCW, healthcare worker; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NA, not available.
Basic recommendations in endemic situation: MDR-Acinetobacter baumannii
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene
(HH)
Moderate Strong Implement HH education programmes to reduce the
transmission of MDR-A. baumannii. HCWs should be
encouraged to perform HH with an alcohol-based hand
rub before and after all patient contacts. Soap and
water hand washing is required when hands are visibly
soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or excretions. Monitoring of
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HH compliance and feedback to HCWs should be
performed to achieve greater compliance. Detailed
indications on how to monitor and improve HH
compliance are provided by the WHO guidelines (level
of recommendation ranked as IA-IB) (available from:
http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/9789241597906/
en/). The use of artiﬁcial nails should be prohibited.
Contact
precautions
(CP)
Moderate Strong Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all
hospital settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition.
HCWs caring for patients colonized or infected with
MDR-A. baumannii should wear gloves and gowns
before entering the room and should remove these
promptly after care and then perform HH. There
should be audit of adherence to CP to ensure that
interventions are being correctly performed to increase
the chances of success. There is no evidence available
to provide recommendations on when to discontinue
CP and for, or against, the implementation of the usage
of droplet precautions when entering the room of
patients receiving CP.
Alert code
(previous
positive) and
pre-emptive CP
Moderate Strong Use alert code to identify promptly patients already
known as colonized at hospital/ward admission and
perform screening and pre-emptive CP.
Isolation room Moderate Strong Isolate colonized and infected patients in a single room to
reduce the risk of acquisition of MDR-A. baumannii. The
implementation of isolation room should include
monitoring for possible deleterious effects such as
clinical complications due to the reduction in contacts
with doctors and nurses, decreases in the quality of life,
and possible psychological adverse effects.
Education Moderate Strong Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why MDR-A. baumannii is important
epidemiologically, why prevention of spread is critical
for control, and which measures for preventing spread
have proven to be effective. Ensure regular
multidisciplinary meetings to implement interventions,
to review adherence audit and to report local data and
feedback to all HCWs and other relevant staff.
Environmental
cleaning (EC)
Moderate Strong Implement regular EC procedures, which include
detergents or disinfectants, depending on local practice
to reduce the transmission rate. Ensure cleaning of
patient care equipment and the environment. When
available, dedicate non-critical medical items for use on
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individual patients colonized or infected with
MDR-A. baumannii. Shared equipment should be
disinfected between use on different patients.
Antimicrobial
stewardship
(ABS)
Moderate Conditional Implement an ABS programme. Consider interventions
that limit the use of speciﬁc antimicrobial agents based
on patients’ case-mix.
Infection
prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
NA There is no evidence available to provide
recommendations for or against the intervention.
However, the authors suggest provision of
administrative support, including economic and human
resources, to prevent and control MDR-A. baumannii
transmission within the healthcare facility. Use public
health resources to support the initiation of IPC
interventions within hospitals. An IPC infrastructure
should include environmental personnel, such as
estates, domestic and janitorial representatives.
HCW, healthcare worker; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NA, not available.
Basic recommendations in endemic situation: Burkholderia cepacia
There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or against, any intervention. However, regardless of the
availability of evidence speciﬁcally related to B. cepacia, the authors of these guidelines believed that there was sufﬁcient
evidence for the value of effective HH as demonstrated for other microorganisms, including other MDR microorganisms, to
also recommend this approach here until studies show otherwise.
Basic recommendations in endemic situation: Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene (HH) Insufﬁcient Strong Regardless of the availability of evidence speciﬁcally related to
S. maltophilia, the authors of these guidelines believed that there
was sufﬁcient evidence for the value of effective HH as
demonstrated for other microorganisms, including other MDR
microorganisms, to also recommend this approach here until
studies show otherwise. Implement HH education programmes
to reduce the transmission of S. maltophilia. HCWs should be
encouraged to perform HH with an alcohol-based hand rub
before and after all patient contacts. Soap and water hand
washing is required when hands are visibly soiled, e.g. with body
ﬂuids or excretions. Monitoring of HH compliance and feedback
to HCWs should be performed to achieve greater compliance.
Detailed indications on how to monitor and improve HH
compliance are provided by the WHO guidelines (level of
recommendation ranked as IA-IB) (available from: http://www.
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who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/9789241597906/en/). The use of
artiﬁcial nails should be prohibited.
Contact precautions (CP) NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for,
or against, the intervention.
Isolation room NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for,
or against, the intervention.
Alert code (previous
positive) and
pre-emptive CP
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for,
or against, the intervention.
Education NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for,
or against, the intervention.
Environmental cleaning
(EC)
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for,
or against, the intervention.
Antimicrobial stewardship
(ABS)
Low Conditional Implement an ABS programme. Consider interventions that limit
the use of speciﬁc antimicrobial agents based on patients’
case-mix.
Infection prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for,
or against, the intervention. However, the authors suggest
provision of administrative support, including economic and
human resources, to prevent and control S. maltophilia
transmission within the healthcare facility. Use public health
resources to support the initiation and support for IPC
interventions within hospitals. An IPC infrastructure should
include environmental personnel, such as estates, domestic and
janitorial representatives.
NA, not available.
Basic and additional speciﬁc approaches in outbreak situation: ESBL-producing Enterobacteriaceae
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene (HH) Moderate Strong Implement HH education programmes to reduce the transmission
of ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae. HCWs should be encouraged to
perform HH with an alcohol-based hand rub before and after all
patient contacts. Soap and water hand washing is required when
hands are visibly soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or excretions.
Monitoring of HH compliance and feedback to HCWs should be
performed to achieve greater compliance. Detailed indications on
how to monitor and improve HH compliance are provided by the
WHO guidelines (level of recommendation ranked as IA-IB)
(available from: http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/
9789241597906/en/). The use of artiﬁcial nails should be
prohibited.
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Active screening cultures
(ASC)
Moderate Strong Implement a programme of ASC at hospital admission followed by
CP to reduce the rate of colonization with ESBL+Enterobacteria-
ceae. Screening cultures should use stool samples or swab
samples from the rectum or perirectal area as well as samples
from the inguinal area and manipulated sites, e.g. catheters and
areas of broken skin such as wounds. The frequency of screening
cultures should be based on the local prevalence of the
microorganism, patient colonization risk, and the case mix of the
unit. Consider performing ASC at the time of hospital admission
for high-risk patients or for all patients in high-risk units such as
cancer or ICU wards, according to local incidence or prevalence
data. Admission, discharge and weekly patient screening might
also be considered to provide feedback to HCWs and to assess
the effectiveness of interventions. Periodic (e.g. weekly) ASC
might be performed for patients remaining in the hospital at high
risk for carriage of MDR-GNB because of ward type (ICU),
prolonged antibiotic(s) therapy, underlying disease, long duration
of stay, presence of devices and surgery. Before transferring
patients with ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae to other healthcare
facilities (acute and non-acute care) ensure communication of
ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae status.
Contact precautions (CP) Moderate Strong Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all hospital
settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition. HCWs caring for
patients colonized or infected with ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae
should wear gloves and gowns before entering the room and
should remove these promptly after care and then perform HH.
There should be audit of adherence to CP to ensure that
interventions are being correctly performed to increase the
chances of success. Evidence for when to discontinue CP, in
patients colonized with ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae, is
heterogeneous and derives from two interventions implementing
CP during all hospitalization or until two negative cultures are
obtained. There is no evidence available to provide
recommendations for, or against, the implementation of droplet
precautions to enter the room of patients in CP.
Alert code (previous
positive) and pre-emptive
CP
Moderate Strong Use alert code to identify promptly patients already known as
colonized at hospital/ward admission and perform screening and
pre-emptive CP. Implement pre-emptive CP for patients
admitted from ICU or wards with cases of
ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae already detected.
Cohort patients Moderate Conditional Cohort patients with the same ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae in
designated areas.
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Cohort staff Moderate Conditional Cohort staff to reduce the risk of acquisition of
ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae.
Isolation room Moderate Strong Isolate colonized and infected patients in a single room to reduce
the risk of acquisition. The implementation of isolation room
should include monitoring for possible deleterious adverse
effects such as clinical complications due to the reduction in
contacts with doctors and nurses, decreases in the quality of life,
and possible psychological adverse effects.
Education Moderate Strong Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae are important
epidemiologically, why prevention of spread is critical for control,
and which measures for preventing spread have proven to be
effective. Ensure regular multidisciplinary meetings to implement
interventions, to review adherence audit, to report local data and
feedback to all HCWs and other relevant staff.
Environmental cleaning
(EC)
Moderate Strong Monitor cleaning performance to ensure consistent EC. Vacate
units for intensive cleaning. Review use of disinfectant agents,
methods and meticulousness of cleaning, dilutions and contact
time of the hospital cleaning procedures. Implement EC
procedures with audit and feedback to reduce transmission of
ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae. Specify in protocols which items are
to be disinfected, which disinfectant to use, and how often items
need to be disinfected. Dedicate the use of non-critical
patient-care equipment to a single patient or cohort of patients
infected or colonized with ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae. Speciﬁc
protocols for the disinfection of endoscopes and respiratory
equipment should be implemented locally. Consider closure
of the ward or the unit to new admissions in order also to
facilitate cleaning until there is evidence of control of
transmission.
Environmental screening Moderate Conditional Perform environmental sampling from surfaces (mattresses, beds,
bedside tables, tables, chairs, armchairs, washbasins, window sills)
that had been in contact with patients colonized or infected by
ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae.
Antimicrobial stewardship
(ABS)
Moderate Strong Plan interventions of restriction of antibiotic usage to reduce the
spread of ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae.
Healthcare-workers
(HCWs) screening
Low Conditional Screen HCWs for ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae if they are
epidemiologically linked to a cluster of cases.
Chlorhexidine gluconate
for patient bathing
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
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Infection prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
Moderate Conditional Provide administrative support, including economic and human
resources, to prevent and control ESBL+Enterobacteriaceae
outbreak transmission.
ESBL, extended-spectrum b-lactamase; HCW, healthcare worker; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NA, not available.
Basic and additional speciﬁc approaches in outbreak situation: MDR-Klebsiella pneumoniae
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene (HH) Very low Strong Regardless of the availability of very low level of evidence
speciﬁcally related to K. pneumoniae, the authors of these
guidelines believed that there was sufﬁcient evidence for the
value of effective HH as demonstrated for other microorganisms,
including other MDR microorganisms, to also recommend this
approach here until studies show otherwise.
Implement HH education programmes to reduce the
transmission of MDR-K. pneumoniae. HCWs should be
encouraged to perform HH with an alcohol-based hand rub
before and after all patient contacts. Soap and water hand
washing is required when hands are visibly soiled, e.g. with body
ﬂuids or excretions. Monitoring of HH compliance and feedback
to HCWs should be performed to achieve greater compliance.
Detailed indications on how to monitor and improve HH
compliance are provided by the WHO guidelines (level of
recommendation ranked as IA-IB) (available from: http://www.
who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/9789241597906/en/). The use of
artiﬁcial nails should be prohibited.
Active screening cultures
(ASC)
Moderate Strong Implement a programme of ASC at hospital admission followed by
CP to reduce the rate of colonization with MDR-K. pneumoniae.
Screening cultures should use stool samples or swab samples
from the rectum or perirectal area as well as samples from the
inguinal area and manipulated sites, e.g. catheters and areas of
broken skin such as wounds. The frequency of screening cultures
should be based on the local prevalence of the microorganism,
patient colonization risk, and the case mix of the unit. Consider
performing ASC at the time of hospital admission for high-risk
patients or for all patients in high-risk units such as cancer or ICU
wards, according to local incidence or prevalence data.
Admission, discharge and weekly patient screening might also be
considered to provide feedback to HCWs and to assess the
effectiveness of interventions. Periodic (e.g.weekly) ASC might be
performed for patients remaining in the hospital at high risk for
carriage of MDR-GNB because of ward type (ICU), prolonged
antibiotic(s) therapy, underlying disease, long duration of stay,
presence of devices and surgery. Before transferring patients with
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MDR-K. pneumoniae to other healthcare facilities (acute and
non-acute care) ensure communication of MDR-K. pneumoniae
status.
Contact precautions (CP) Moderate Strong Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all hospital
settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition. HCWs caring for
patients colonized or infected with MDR-K. pneumoniae should
wear gloves and gowns before entering the room and should
remove these promptly after care and then perform HH. There
should be audit of adherence to CP to ensure that interventions
are being correctly performed to increase the chances of success.
Evidence of when to discontinue CP is available only from one
intervention where CP were maintained for the entire duration
of hospitalization. There is no evidence available to provide
recommendations for, or against, the usage of droplet
precautions to enter the room of patients in CP.
Alert code (previous
positive) and pre-emptive
CP
Moderate Strong Use alert code to identify promptly patients already known as
colonized at hospital/ward admission and perform screening and
pre-emptive CP.
Cohort patients Moderate Conditional Cohort patients with the same MDR-K. pneumoniae in designated
areas.
Cohort staff Moderate Strong Cohort staff to reduce the risk of acquisition of MDR-K.
pneumoniae.
Isolation room Moderate Strong Isolate colonized and infected patients in a single room to reduce
the risk of acquisition. The implementation of isolation room
should include monitoring for possible adverse effects such as
clinical complications due to the reduction of contacts with
doctors and nurses, decreases in the quality of life, and possible
psychological adverse effects.
Education Moderate Conditional Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why MDR-K. pneumoniae is important
epidemiologically, why prevention of spread is critical for control,
and which measures for preventing spread have proven to be
effective. Ensure regular multidisciplinary meetings to implement
interventions, to review adherence audit, to report local data and
feedback to all HCWs and other relevant staff.
Environmental cleaning
(EC)
Moderate Conditional Monitor cleaning performance to ensure consistent EC. Vacate units
for intensive cleaning. Review use of disinfectant agents, methods
and meticulousness of cleaning, dilutions, and contact time of the
hospital cleaning procedures. Implement EC procedures with audit
and feedback to reduce transmission of MDR-K. pneumoniae.
Specify in protocols which items are to be disinfected, which
disinfectant to use, and how often items need to be disinfected.
Dedicate the use of non-critical patient-care equipment to a single
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patient or cohort of patients infected or colonized with
MDR-K. pneumoniae. Speciﬁc protocols for the disinfection of
endoscopes and respiratory equipment should be implemented
locally. Consider closure of the ward or the unit to new admissions
in order also to facilitate cleaning until there is evidence of control
of transmission.
Environmental screening Low Conditional Perform environmental sampling and UV light surveillance of
surfaces (mattresses, beds, bedside tables, tables, chairs,
armchairs, washbasins, window sills) that have been in contact
with patients colonized or infected by MDR-K. pneumoniae.
Antimicrobial stewardship
(ABS)
Very low Conditional Plan interventions of restriction of antibiotic usage to reduce the
spread of MDR-K. pneumoniae.
Healthcare-workers
(HCWs) screening
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Chlorhexidine gluconate
for patient bathing
Low Conditional Bathing patients with chlorhexidine soap or chlorhexidine-
impregnated cloths may be useful as a part of a multifaceted
approach to reduce transmission of MDR-K. pneumoniae.
Infection prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
Moderate Conditional Provide administrative support, including economic and human
resources, to prevent and control MDR-K. pneumoniae outbreak
transmission.
HCW, healthcare worker; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NA: not available.
Basic and additional speciﬁc approaches in outbreak situation: MDR-Pseudomonas aeruginosa
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene (HH) Very low Strong Regardless of the availability of a very low level of evidence
speciﬁcally related to P. aeruginosa, the authors of these
guidelines believed that there was sufﬁcient evidence for the
value of effective HH as demonstrated for other microorganisms,
including other MDR microorganisms, to also recommend this
approach here until studies show otherwise.
Implement HH education programmes to reduce the
transmission of P. aeruginosa. HCWs should be encouraged to
perform HH with an alcohol-based hand rub before and after all
patient contacts. Soap and water hand washing is required when
hands are visibly soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or excretions.
Monitoring of HH compliance and feedback to HCWs should be
performed to achieve greater compliance. Detailed indications on
how to monitor and improve HH compliance are provided by the
WHO guidelines (level of recommendation ranked as IA-IB)
(available from: http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/
9789241597906/en/). The use of artiﬁcial nails should be
prohibited.
ª2013 The Authors
Clinical Microbiology and Infection ª2013 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 20 (Suppl. 1), 1–55
CMI Tacconelli et al. Guidelines to reduce the hospital spread of MDR-GNB 37
1 (Continued)
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Active screening cultures
(ASC)
Very low Strong Implement a programme of ASC at hospital admission followed by
CP to reduce the rate of colonization with MDR-P. aeruginosa.
Regardless of the availability of a very low level of evidence
speciﬁcally related to P. aeruginosa, the authors of these
guidelines believed that there was sufﬁcient evidence for the
value of effective ASC as demonstrated for other
microorganisms, including other MDR microorganisms, to also
recommend this approach here until studies show otherwise.
Screening cultures should use stool samples or swab samples
from the rectum or perirectal area as well as samples from the
inguinal area and manipulated sites, e.g. catheters and areas of
broken skin such as wounds. The frequency of screening cultures
should be based on the local prevalence of the microorganism,
patient colonization risk, and the case mix of the unit. Consider
performing ASC at the time of hospital admission for high-risk
patients or for all patients in high-risk units such as cancer or
ICU wards, according to local incidence or prevalence data.
Admission, discharge and weekly patient screening might also be
considered to provide feedback to HCWs and to assess the
effectiveness of interventions. Periodic (e.g. weekly) ASC might
be performed for patients remaining in the hospital at high risk
for carriage of MDR-P. aeruginosa because of ward type (ICU),
prolonged antibiotic(s) therapy, underlying disease, long duration
of stay, presence of devices and surgery. Before transferring
patients with MDR-P. aeruginosa to other healthcare facilities
(acute and non-acute care) ensure communication of
MDR-P. aeruginosa status.
Contact precautions (CP) Very low Strong Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all hospital
settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition. HCWs caring for
patients colonized or infected with MDR-P. aeruginosa should
wear gloves and gowns before entering the room and should
remove these promptly after care and then perform HH. There
should be audit of adherence to CP to ensure that interventions
are being correctly performed to increase the chances of success.
Regardless of the availability of a very low level of evidence
speciﬁcally related to P. aeruginosa, the authors of these
guidelines believed that there was sufﬁcient evidence for the
value of CP as demonstrated for other microorganisms, including
other MDR microorganisms, to also recommend this approach
here until studies show otherwise. There is no evidence available
to provide recommendations on when to discontinue CP and for,
or against, the implementation of the usage of droplet
precautions to enter the room of patients in CP.
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Alert code (previous
positive) and pre-emptive
CP
Very low Conditional Use alert code to identify promptly patients already known as
colonized at hospital/ward admission and perform screening and
pre-emptive CP.
Cohort patients Very low Conditional Cohort patientswith the sameMDR-P. aeruginosa in designated areas.
Cohort staff Very low Conditional Cohort staff to reduce the risk of acquisition of MDR-P. aeruginosa.
Isolation room Low Strong Isolate colonized and infected patients in a single room to reduce
the risk of acquisition. The implementation of isolation room
should include monitoring for possible adverse effects such as
clinical complications due to the reduction in contacts with
doctors and nurses, decreases in the quality of life, and possible
psychological adverse effects.
Education Very low Conditional Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why MDR-P. aeruginosa is important
epidemiologically, why prevention of spread is critical for control,
and which measures for preventing spread have proven to be
effective. Ensure regular multidisciplinary meetings to implement
interventions, to review adherence audit, to report local data and
feedback to all HCWs and other relevant staff.
Environmental cleaning
(EC)
Moderate Conditional Monitor cleaning performance to ensure consistent EC. Vacate
units for intensive cleaning. Review use of disinfectant agents,
methods and meticulousness of cleaning, dilutions and contact
time of the hospital cleaning procedures. Implement EC
procedures with audit and feedback to reduce transmission of
MDR-P. aeruginosa. Specify in protocols which items are to be
disinfected, which disinfectant to use, and how often items need
to be disinfected. Dedicate the use of non-critical patient-care
equipment to a single patient or cohort of patients infected or
colonized with MDR-P. aeruginosa. Speciﬁc protocols for the
disinfection of endoscopes and respiratory equipment should be
implemented locally. Consider closure of the ward or the unit to
new admissions in order also to facilitate cleaning until there is
evidence of control of transmission.
Environmental screening Low Conditional Perform environmental samples from surfaces (mattresses, beds,
bedside tables, tables, chairs, armchairs, washbasins, window sills)
that have been in contact with patients colonized or infected by
MDR-P. aeruginosa.
Antimicrobial stewardship
(ABS)
Very low Conditional Plan interventions of restriction of antibiotic usage to reduce the
spread of MDR-P. aeruginosa.
Healthcare-workers
(HCWs) screening
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Chlorhexidine gluconate
for patient bathing
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
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Infection prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention. However, authors suggest provision of
administrative support, including economic and human resources,
to prevent and control MDR-P. aeruginosa outbreak transmission.
HCW, healthcare worker; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NA: not available.
Basic and additional speciﬁc approaches in outbreak situation: MDR-Acinetobacter baumannii
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene (HH) Moderate Strong Implement HH education programmes to reduce the transmission
of MDR-A. baumannii. HCWs should be encouraged to perform
HH withan alcohol-based hand rub before and after all patient
contacts. Soap and water hand washing is required when hands
are visibly soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or excretions. Monitoring
of HH compliance and feedback to HCWs should be performed
to achieve greater compliance. Detailed indications on how to
monitor and improve HH compliance are provided by the WHO
guidelines (level of recommendation ranked as IA-IB) (available
from: http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/9789241597906/en/).
The use of artiﬁcial nails should be prohibited.
Active screening cultures
(ASC)
Moderate Strong Implement a programme of ASC at hospital admission followed by
CP to reduce the rate of colonization with MDR-A. baumannii.
Screening cultures should use stool samples or swab samples
from the rectum or perirectal area as well as samples from the
inguinal area and manipulated sites, e.g. catheters and areas of
broken skin such as wounds. The frequency of screening cultures
should be based on the local prevalence of the microorganism,
patient colonization risk, and the case mix of the unit. Consider
performing ASC at the time of hospital admission for high-risk
patients or for all patients in high-risk units such as cancer or ICU
wards, according to local incidence or prevalence data.
Admission, discharge and weekly patient screening might also be
considered to provide feedback to HCWs and to assess the
effectiveness of interventions. Periodic (e.g. weekly) ASC might
be performed for patients remaining in the hospital at high risk
for carriage of MDR-A. baumannii because of ward type (ICU),
prolonged antibiotic(s) therapy, underlying disease, long duration
of stay, presence of devices and surgery. Before transferring
patients with MDR-A. baumannii to other healthcare facilities
(acute and non-acute care) ensure communication of
MDR-A. baumannii status.
Contact precautions (CP) Moderate Strong Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all hospital
settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition. HCWs caring for
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patients colonized or infected with MDR-A. baumannii should
wear gloves and gowns before entering the room and should
remove these promptly after care and then perform HH. There
should be audit of adherence to CP to ensure that interventions
are being correctly performed to increase the chances of success.
Evidence of when to discontinue CP is very heterogeneous
(ranging from keeping CP throughout the hospitalization, to
discontinuing it after two or three negative cultures) and does
not allow provision of any speciﬁc recommendation. Consider
using droplet precautions to enter the room of colonized or
infected patients in ICU settings and for all aereosol-producing
procedures (low level of evidence; conditional recommendation).
Alert code (previous
positive) and pre-emptive
CP
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Cohort patients Very low Conditional Cohort patients with the same MDR-A. baumannii in designated
areas.
Cohort staff Low Conditional Cohort staff to reduce the risk of acquisition of MDR-A. baumannii.
Isolation room Low Strong Isolate colonized and infected patients in a single room to reduce
the risk of acquisition. The implementation of isolation room
should include monitoring for possible adverse effects such as
clinical complications due to the reduction in contacts with
doctors and nurses, decreases of the quality of life, and possible
psychological adverse effects.
Education Moderate Conditional Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why MDR-A. baumannii is important
epidemiologically, why prevention of spread is critical for control,
and which measures for preventing spread have proven to be
effective. Ensure regular multidisciplinary meetings to implement
interventions, to review adherence audit and to report local data
and feedback to all HCWs and other relevant staff.
Environmental cleaning
(EC)
Moderate Strong Monitor cleaning performance to ensure consistent EC. Vacate
units for intensive cleaning. Review use of disinfectant agents,
methods and meticulousness of cleaning, dilutions and contact
time of the hospital cleaning procedures. Implement EC
procedures with audit and feedback to reduce transmission of
MDR-A. baumannii. Specify in protocols which items are to be
disinfected, which disinfectant to use, and how often items need
to be disinfected. Dedicate the use of non-critical patient-care
equipment to a single patient or cohort of patients infected or
colonized with MDR-A. baumannii. Speciﬁc protocols for the
disinfection of endoscopes and respiratory equipment should be
implemented locally. Consider closure of the ward or the unit to
ª2013 The Authors
Clinical Microbiology and Infection ª2013 European Society of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, CMI, 20 (Suppl. 1), 1–55
CMI Tacconelli et al. Guidelines to reduce the hospital spread of MDR-GNB 41
1 (Continued)
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
new admissions in order also to facilitate cleaning until there is
evidence of control of transmission.
Environmental screening Moderate Conditional Perform environmental sampling from surfaces (mattresses, beds,
bedside tables, tables, chairs, armchairs, washbasins, window sills)
that have been in contact with patients colonized or infected by
MDR-A. baumannii.
Antimicrobial stewardship
(ABS)
Moderate Conditional Plan interventions of restriction of antibiotic usage to reduce the
spread of MDR-A. baumannii.
Healthcare-workers
(HCWs) screening
Very low Conditional Screen HCWs for MDR-A. baumannii if they are epidemiologically
linked to a cluster of cases.
Chlorhexidine gluconate
for patient bathing
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Infection prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
Very low Conditional Provide administrative support, including economic and human
resources, to prevent and control MDR-A. baumannii outbreak
transmission.
Basic and additional speciﬁc approaches in outbreak situation: Burkholderia cepacia
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene (HH) Very
low
Strong Regardless of the availability of very low level of evidence speciﬁcally
related to B. cepacia, the authors of these guidelines believed that
there was sufﬁcient evidence for the value of effective HH as
demonstrated for other microorganisms, including other MDR
microorganisms, to also recommend this approach here until
studies show otherwise.
Implement HH education programmes to reduce the transmission
of B. cepacia. HCWs should be encouraged to perform HH with
an alcohol-based hand rub before and after all patient contacts.
Soap and water hand washing is required when hands are visibly
soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or excretions. Monitoring of HH
compliance and feedback to HCWs should be performed to
achieve greater compliance. Detailed indications on how to
monitor and improve HH compliance are provided by the WHO
guidelines (level of recommendation ranked as IA-IB) (available
from: http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/9789241597906/en/).
The use of artiﬁcial nails should be prohibited.
Active screening cultures
(ASC)
Very
low
Conditional Implement a programme of ASC at hospital admission followed by
CP to reduce the rate of colonization with B. cepacia. Screening
cultures should use stool samples or swab samples from the
rectum or perirectal area as well as samples from the inguinal area
and manipulated sites, e.g. catheters and areas of broken skin such
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as wounds. The frequency of screening cultures should be based
on the local prevalence of the microorganism, patient colonization
risk, and the case mix of the unit. Consider performing ASC at the
time of hospital admission for high-risk patients or for all patients
in high-risk units such as cancer or ICU wards, according to local
incidence or prevalence data. Admission, discharge and weekly
patient screening might also be considered to provide feedback to
HCWs and to assess the effectiveness of interventions. Periodic
(e.g. weekly) ASC might be performed for patients remaining in
the hospital at high risk for carriage of MDR-GNB because of
ward type (ICU), prolonged antibiotic(s) therapy, underlying
disease, long duration of stay, presence of devices and surgery.
Before transferring patients with B. cepacia to other healthcare
facilities (acute and non-acute care) ensure communication of
B. cepacia status.
Contact precautions (CP) Low Conditional Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all hospital
settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition. HCWs caring for
patients colonized or infected with B. cepacia should wear gloves
and gowns before entering the room and should remove these
promptly after care and then perform HH. There should be audit
of adherence to CP to ensure that interventions are being
correctly performed to increase the chances of success. There is
no evidence available to provide recommendations on when to
discontinue CP and for, or against, the implementation of the
usage of droplet precautions to enter the room of patients in CP.
Alert code (previous
positive) and pre-emptive
CP
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Cohort patients Low Conditional Cohort patients with B. cepacia in designated areas.
Cohort staff NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Isolation room NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Education Very
low
Conditional Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why B. cepacia is important epidemiologically, why
prevention of spread is critical for control, and which measures
for preventing spread have proven to be effective. Ensure regular
multidisciplinary meetings to implement interventions, to review
adherence audit, to report local data and feedback to all HCWs
and other relevant staff.
Environmental cleaning
(EC)
Very
low
Conditional Monitor cleaning performance to ensure consistent EC. Vacate
units for intensive cleaning. Review use of disinfectant agents,
methods and meticulousness of cleaning, dilutions and contact
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time of the hospital cleaning procedures. Implement EC
procedures with audit and feedback to reduce transmission of
B. cepacia. Specify in protocols which items are to be disinfected,
which disinfectant to use, and how often items need to be
disinfected. Dedicate the use of non-critical patient-care
equipment to a single patient or cohort of patients infected or
colonized with B. cepacia. Speciﬁc protocols for the disinfection of
endoscopes and respiratory equipment should be implemented
locally. Consider closure of the ward or the unit to new
admissions in order also to facilitate cleaning until there is
evidence of control of transmission.
Environmental screening Very
low
Conditional Perform environmental sampling from surfaces (mattresses, beds,
bedside tables, tables, chairs, armchairs, washbasins, window sills)
that have been in contact with patients colonized or infected by
B. cepacia.
Antimicrobial stewardship
(ABS)
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Healthcare-workers
(HCWs) screening
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Chlorhexidine gluconate
for patient bathing
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Infection prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for,
or against, the intervention. However, authors suggest provision
of administrative support, including economic and human
resources, to prevent and control B. cepacia outbreak
transmission.
Basic and additional speciﬁc approaches in outbreak situation: Stenotrophomonas maltophilia
Intervention Evidence Recommendation Note
Hand hygiene (HH) Moderate Strong Implement HH education programmes to reduce the transmission
of S. maltophilia. HCWs should be encouraged to perform HH
with an alcohol-based hand rub before and after all patient
contacts. Soap and water hand washing is required when hands
are visibly soiled, e.g. with body ﬂuids or excretions. Monitoring
of HH compliance and feedback to HCWs should be performed
to achieve greater compliance. Detailed indications on how to
monitor and improve HH compliance are provided by the WHO
guidelines (level of recommendation ranked as IA-IB) (available
from: http://www.who.int/gpsc/5may/tools/9789241597906/en/).
The use of artiﬁcial nails should be prohibited.
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Active screening cultures
(ASC)
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Contact precautions (CP) Moderate Conditional Implement CP for all colonized patient encounters, in all hospital
settings, so as to reduce the risk of acquisition. HCWs caring for
patients colonized or infected with S. maltophilia should wear
gloves and gowns before entering the room and should remove
these promptly after care and then perform HH. There should be
audit of adherence to CP to ensure that interventions are being
correctly performed to increase the chances of success. There is
no evidence available to provide recommendations on when to
discontinue CP and for, or against, the implementation of the
usage of droplet precautions to enter the room of patients in CP.
Alert code (previous
positive) and pre-emptive
CP
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Cohort patients NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Cohort staff NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Isolation room NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Education Moderate Conditional Conduct educational programmes to ensure that HCWs
understand why S. maltophilia is important epidemiologically, why
prevention of spread is critical for control, and which measures
for preventing spread have proven to be effective. Ensure regular
multidisciplinary meetings to implement interventions, to review
adherence audit, to report local data and feedback to all HCWs
and other relevant staff.
Environmental cleaning
(EC)
Moderate Conditional Monitor cleaning performance to ensure consistent EC. Vacate
units for intensive cleaning. Review use of disinfectant agents,
methods and meticulousness of cleaning, dilutions and contact
time of the hospital cleaning procedures. Implement EC
procedures with audit and feedback to reduce transmission of
S. malthopilia. Specify in protocols which items are to be
disinfected, which disinfectant to use, and how often items need
to be disinfected. Dedicate the use of non-critical patient-care
equipment to a single patient or cohort of patients infected or
colonized with S. maltophilia. Speciﬁc protocols for the
disinfection of endoscopes and respiratory equipment should be
implemented locally. Consider closure of the ward or the unit to
new admissions in order also to facilitate cleaning until there is
evidence of control of transmission.
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Environmental screening Moderate Conditional Perform environmental sampling from surfaces (mattresses, beds,
bedside tables, tables, chairs, armchairs, washbasins, window sills)
that have been in contact with patients colonized or infected by
S. maltophilia.
Antimicrobial stewardship
(ABS)
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Healthcare-workers
(HCWs) screening
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Chlorhexidine gluconate
for patient bathing
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention.
Infection prevention and
control (IPC)
infrastructure
NA There is no evidence available to provide recommendations for, or
against, the intervention. However, the authors suggest provision
of administrative support, including economic and human
resources, to prevent and control S. maltophilia outbreak
transmission.
HCW, healthcare worker; MDR, multidrug-resistant; NA: not available.
Approaches in Case of Transmission Control
Failure
If control of transmission is not achieved by following the
recommended measures, ward closure should be considered
and additional epidemiological investigations should be per-
formed, including searches for unusual environmental reser-
voirs which have epidemiological links to cases or may be using
atypical transmission mechanisms.
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